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A Study of Subrogation Mostly in Letter of




Sometimes issuers of abstract obligations (standby letters of credit and
independent bank guarantees)' find after they have paid on the obligation that
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origins in a presentation to the faculty of the Molengraaff Institute for Private Law at
the University of Utrecht in 1993, and the Author acknowledges the helpful comments
and suggestions of the members of that faculty, especially Willem Grossheide, Arthur
Hartkamp, and Frans van der Velde. Special thanks also to Laura Bartell, David Gray
Carlson, Eric Kades, Michael McIntyre, Cynthia Baker, and James J. White for their
comments and criticism and to Matthew Engelbert, Amy Munerantz, and R. Bryan
Schneider for research assistance.
1. In a classic abstract payment obligation transaction, the seller of goods or
services on credit insists that the buyer obtain an abstract payment obligation to secure
the buyer's obligation to pay the seller's invoice when it comes due. If the buyer does
not pay, the seller draws on the abstract obligation, usually by presenting the issuer
(usually the buyer's bank) with documents: a draft, a copy of the invoice, and a




This Article uses the broader term "abstract obligation" in lieu of the term "standby
letter of credit" or "independent bank guarantee" because it is now clear that standby
credits are a subset of a wider category of commercial product. While much of the
literature, including some by this Author, has assumed that standby letters of credit were
unique abstract undertakings, it is evident that only in the United States are they the
principal abstract obligation. Offshore banks have for some time been issuing
independent bank guarantees, to which courts have almost universally and intentionally
applied standby credit law, and which are now the subject of a United Nations
Convention, the UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of
Credit, which was promulgated in 1995 (hereinafter UN CONVENTION). For cases
treating the independent guarantee and the sthndby credit as essentially the same
commercial product, see American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc.,
583 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Banque Paribas v.
Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 767 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985); Coca Cola Fin. Corp. v. Finsat
Int'l Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 274 (C.A. 1996). Professor Goode has taken pains to define
the general category as "abstract payment undertakings." See Roy Goode, Abstract
Payment Undertakings in Essays for Patrick Atiyah (Peter Cane et al. eds., 1991); Roy
Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings in International Transactions, 22 BROOK J. INT'L
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their right of reimbursement is impaired. In that case, the issuer, usually a bank,
has erred; it has extended credit to a party that cannot pay. While efficiency
analysis would leave the loss on the erring bank, the revised version of Article
5 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("Revised Article 5") includes a provision
granting subrogation to letter of credit issuers as if they were sureties.2 Some
commentators view this statutory provision as a surefire source of subrogation
for the banks.
This Article mounts an argument to the contrary. Because subrogation is
an equitable remedy resting on an unjust enrichment standard,3 this Article
contends that bank issuers must make an unjust enrichment case before they can
avail themselves of the subrogation remedy, even under Revised Article 5. This
Article attempts to demonstrate, moreover, that the case for unjust enrichment
in these transactions is difficult to make and that courts should accord banks the
remedy sparingly. The arguments against subrogation also expand to cover other
players in the standby letter of credit transaction, and this Article concludes that
as a general principle those players should not have subrogation.
Part II explains that subrogation is a remedy, not a right, and that it is
available to a plaintiff only in case of unjust enrichment. Part III argues that
proper respect for subrogation's nature as a remedy and for the unjust
enrichment prerequisite does not permit mechanical application of the remedy,
either by granting or denying it. Part IV explains the difficulty of showing
unjust enrichment in most abstract obligation settings, and it explains the damage
that promiscuous granting of the remedy visits on the abstract obligation as a
commercial device.
Part V analyzes Section 5-117 of Revised Article 5 and concludes that,
contrary to first impressions, nothing in that section impedes the analysis offered
here. Part VI suggests that while there is an argument that the Bankruptcy Code
commands mechanical denial of the remedy, a fair reading can be made that the
Bankruptcy Code does not interfere with the analysis this Article advances as a
matter of UCC law and common law. Finally, Part VII contends that proper
regard for private ordering of burdens supports limited availability of the remedy
to issuers and others in abstract obligation settings unless the parties are unable
to engage in that private ordering.
II. SUBROGATION AS A REMEDY
L. 1 (1996); Roy Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings and the Rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 725 (1995).
2. The provision is U.C.C. § 5-117 (1995), the last section in the letter of credit
article. The appendix beginning on the last page of this Article sets out the text of the
provision and of the official comments.
3. For discussion of the rules/standard literature, see Clayton Gillette, Rules,
Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REv. 181 (1996).
[V ol. 64
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Much of what is advanced here rests on the often ignored fact that
subrogation is an equitable remedy,4 not a right.' Because it is a remedy,
application of subrogation to any setting must abide determination that the
conditions for the remedy obtain.6 It is an established principle of subrogation
law that the purpose of subrogation is to provide restitution when the absence of
restitutionary relief would yield unjust enrichment.7 In fact, one can say that
most commentators who have considered the role of subrogation are generally
4. Dawson refers to subrogation as a "generalized remedial device." JOHN
DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 141 (1951); cf JOHN
DAWSON, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L. J. 175, 184 (1959) (referring to
subrogation as one of the "restitution remedies"). Accord LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY &
GARETH JONES, THELAW OF RESTITTrnON 524 (3d ed. 1986); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION 21 (1978); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURrIY § 141 cmt a (1941);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27 cmt a (1995).
5. Some of the commentary that disagrees with the conclusions of this Article
refers to subrogation as a "right." See, e.g, Carter Klein, Subrogation Rights andLetters
of Credit-Get Ready, LETTERS OF CREDIT REPORT, May-June 1995, at 1; Peter Jarvis,
Standby Letters of Credit-Issuers'Subrogation and Assignment Rights, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 356
(1977) (Pt. I), 10 U.C.C. L.J. 38 (1977) (Pt. II). That characterization of subrogation
pretermits the unjust enrichment inquiry, which is generally a prerequisite for this
remedy. The presumption, therefore, prejudices the inquiry. Both Carter and Jarvis
would not grant subrogation if it weakens the abstract obligation as a commercial
product. Because the characterization of subrogation as a right avoids the need to fasten
on the prerequisites, these commentators may have missed the fact that subrogation does
indeed impact the abstract obligation adversely.
6. "Subrogation being equitable, it follows that equitable considerations limit the
right." LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 209 (1950).
"Not much reflection is required for one to discover that at every point in this complex
equation there are judgments of fairness and social policy, even before one faces the
critical question, when is enrichment 'unjust'?" EDWARD W. SPENCER, THE GENERAL
LAW OF SURETYSHIP 177 (1913) (speaking of equitable origins of subrogation).
7. "Where property of one person is used in discharging an obligation owed by
another or a lien upon the property of another, under such circumstances that the other
would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former is
entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee or lien-holder." RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §162 (1937) (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27 cmt. a (1996); DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 405
(2d ed. 1993) (hereinafter REMEDIES).
1999]
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in agreement that unjust enrichment is the sine qua non of subrogation.8 Thus,
in the absence of unjust enrichment the subrogation remedy is not available.
It may be sufficient to make the case against subrogation in abstract
obligation transactions to rely on that historical feature of subrogation law. This
Article carries the argument further, however, by contending that in the abstract
obligation context, application of the subrogation remedy when unjust
enrichment facts are absent produces mischievous commercial law. In short,
application of the subrogation remedy without regard for unjust enrichment facts
not only departs from traditional subrogation doctrine, it also generates bad law.
Finally, this Article examines the role of the subrogation section in Revised
Article 5 and concludes that the proper purpose of the provision is modest: to
rectify the error of those who would ignore the unjust enrichment basis of the
subrogation remedy.
IH. PROPER APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY
A. In the Abstract Obligation Context
In the abstract obligation context, mechanical application of any
subrogation rule prevents subrogation in virtually all cases.9 That virtually
8. Unjust enrichment is "an indispensable element" of subrogation. 3 PALMER,
supra note 4, at 343. Subrogation "is properly used only as a means of preventing unjust
enrichment." 3 PALMER, supra note 4, at 344. "The test is entirely empirical. It is...
impossible to formulate any narrower principle than that the doctrine [of subrogation]
will be applied only when the courts are satisfied that reason and justice demand that it
should be." GOFF & JONES, supra note 4, at 527. Whether a surety is subrogated is a
matter of "equity and good conscience." ID SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF CONTRACTS 844 (3d ed. 1967). "Subrogation is another equitable remedy in
which tracing is used to prevent unjust enrichment .... ." DAN DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF REMEDIES 250 (1973) (hereinafter HANDBOOK). Equitable subrogation "is
imposed by courts to prevent unjust enrichment." REMEDIES, supra note 7, at 405.
"[S]ubrogation in this sense is to be denied when the court concludes that there is no
unjust enrichment." REMEDIES, supra note 7, at 405. "Subrogation is a remedy that
exists to prevent the unjust enrichment of the principal obligor at the expense of the
secondary obligor." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27 cmt.
g (1996). See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1936).
"Subrogation, as a creature of equity, is subject to the limitation that it will not be
allowed where it will prejudice creditor or be inequitable to third persons."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECUmITY § 141 cmt. a (1941).
9. There are several instances when subrogation can arise in the abstract obligation
setting. One commentator has identified nine of them. See Klein, supra note 5, at 1.
The first three points in this Article relate to one of the most common instances on
Klein's list: subrogation of the abstract obligation issuer (or the confirmer) to the rights
of the beneficiary against the applicant or one related to the applicant. It is that
subrogation that threatens the independence of the abstract obligation. The scope of the
4
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complete prohibition of the subrogation remedy arises by virtue of a distinction
between abstract obligations and secondary guaranties that has bedeviled much
of the learning in this area.
It is classic subrogation law ° that a surety that pays the debt of its principal
is subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the principal. Since much
subrogation law comes to us from suretyship law, it is worth considering
whether the differences between abstract obligations and traditional, secondary
guaranties justify disparate treatment of abstract obligations or whether the
differences are superficial only.
fourth point, however, extends beyond that single setting.
10. This Article describes U.S. subrogation law, which is rather generous in
according the remedy. English and Canadian courts have been less generous. For a
thoughtful and scholarly opinion that engages in the comparative exercise and rejects
subrogation for a letter of credit issuer, see Westpac Banking Corp. v. Duke Group Ltd.,
[1994] O.R.3d 515. See also Paul v. Speirway Ltd., 2 All E.R. 587, 597-98 (Ch. 1976)
(no subrogation when party seeking it was really an unsecured lender); Orakpo v.
Manson Invs. Ltd., 3 All E.R. 1, 7 (H.L. 1977) (judgment of Lord Diplock reciting that
English law does not recognize unjust enrichment as a general doctrine and still bottoms
subrogation on the presumed intent of the parties).
11. In a suretyship transaction, the parties have different names. Thus, if the seller
in the credit sale illustrated supra note 1 takes a surety's undertaking rather than a
standby credit, the seller remains the beneficiary of the undertaking, but the buyer is no
longer the applicant. The buyer is the "principal," and the issuer is the "surety." See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27 (1996).
1999]
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While a few commentators question it,'2 the overwhelming weight of the
commentary, 13 domestic law,14 and international law15 differentiates abstract
12. Professor Cohen argues that it is "obvious" that "[s]tandby letters of credit
fulfill the same economic function as secondary obligations, that is, guarantees and other
suretyship devices." Neil Cohen, Subrogation: A Further Probing, LETrERS OF CREDIT
REPORT, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 5. He argues that the commercial devices differ only in that
they are governed by "different rules" and that standby letters of credit are subject to a
"different legal regime." Id. As reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
AND GUARANTY (1996), he originally urged that standby letters of credit be subject to the
Restatement, but in the earliest draft of the scope provision excluded the standby because
the issuer of a standby "is not a secondary obligor." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
OF SURETYSHIP § 1 cmt. j (Tentative Draft 1991); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 4(2) (1996) (excluding letters of credit from the scope of
the Restatement). The comment to Section 4(2) indicates that the exclusion of letters of
credit from the Restatement was a consequence of the fact that they were subject to well
developed law and that it would not serve any purpose to "disturb that state of affairs."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § (2) cmt. c (1996). Professor
Boss, claiming that "these letters of credit are being used interchangeably with guarantees
and surety bonds," also urged that letters of credit be subject to the Restatement. Amy
Boss, Suretyship and Letters of Credit: Subrogation Revisited, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1087, 1136(1993). Professor Alces also questions the assertion that there are functional
differences between letters of credit and guaranties and has expressed his dissatisfaction
with the Restatement's stated reason for the exclusion of abstract obligations from its
scope. See Peter A. Alces, An Essay on Independence, Interdependence, and the
Suretyship Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 447,479. Both he and Professor Boss would
include letters of credit in the Restatement. These writers make serious arguments that
merit thoughtful and thorough response. It is sufficient to say here that this Article is not
the place to make that response, but that it is necessary to acknowledge that if they are
correct when they argue that it is not function, but only legal rules that differentiate
abstract obligations from guaranties, the thesis of this Article largely fails.
13. See ROELAND BERTRAMS, BANK GUARANTEES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3-5
(2d rev. ed. 1996); FRANS DE RooY, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 99-100 (1984); E.P.
ELLINGER, DOCUMENTARY LETTERS OF CREDIT 48 (1970); HENRY HARFIELD, BANK
CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 163-65 (5th ed. 1974); NORBERT HORN & EDDY
WYMEERSCH, BANK-GUARANTEES, STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT AND PERFORMANCE
BONDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1990); RAYMOND JACK, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS
§ 12.28 (1991); MATH S. KURKELA, LETTERS OF CREDIT UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 194 (1985); KEVIN MCGUINNESS, THE LAW OF GUARANTEE 12.71-.74 (2d ed.
1995); LAZAR SARNA, LETTERS OF CREDIT ch. 5 §§ 1-2 (3d ed. 1992); JEAN STOUFFLET,
LE CREDIT DOCUMENTAIRE 298-300 (1957); PAUL TODD, BILLS OF LADING AND
BANKERS' DOCUMENTARY CREDITS § 8.2 (1990); JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ch. 20 § c (4th ed. 1995); BROOKE WUNNICKE ET AL.,
STANDBY AND COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT § 2.9 (2d ed. 1996).
14. "Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary... are independent of the
existence, performance, or nonperformance of a contract or arrangement out of which the
letter of credit arises ...." U.C.C. § 5-103(d)(1995). "Parties to a contract may use a
letter of credit to make certain that contractual disputes wend their way toward resolution
[Vol. 64
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obligations (standby letters of credit and independent guarantees) from
dependent obligations (secondary guaranties and suretyship obligations) in one
important functional respect. The distinction rests on the notion that abstract
obligations (usually standby letters of credit in the United States) are
independent of the transaction out of which they arise. This independence or
abstraction principle holds that the obligor on the abstract obligation (the issuer
of the credit or the independent guarantee) must pay the beneficiary,
notwithstanding the circumstances of the underlying transaction. 6 Importantly,
the distinction is not a product of law, for law in this instance follows
commercial function. First and foremost, the distinction is one of function. In
this sense, one might say that abstract obligations are primary 7 because they are
payable without regard to the failure to pay or the occurrence of a breach or
other default in the underlying transaction. In short, the issuer's liability does
not derive from the liability of the debtor but from the issuer's own undertaking.
with money in the beneficiary's pocket rather than in the pocket of the contracting party."
Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1984). The premise of the
guaranty is that the parties argue first and then the guarantor pays, but the premise of the
abstract obligation is "pay now, argue later." Eakin v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 875 F.2d 114, 116 (7th Cir. 1989).
15. See UN CONVENION ON INDEPENDENT GUARANTEES AND STAND-BY LETTERS
OF CREDrr art. 3 (1995); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS
AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDIT arts. 3 & 4 (1993); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM RULES FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES art. 2(b)(1992).
16. The important exception to this principle is the case of fraud, where the courts
and Article 5 render the credit subject to the fraud defense even though the fraud may
arise in the underlying transaction. See U.C.C. § 5-109 (1995); Szetjn v. J. Henry
Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Whether that exception
swallows the independence principle is the chief question on which the commentators
disagree. It is fair to say that the overwhelming weight of case and academic authority
supports the independence principle as a viable feature of abstract obligation law and
practice, and limits it in various ways. It is beyond the scope of this Article to enter that
debate. For the weight of U.S. authority, see Airline Reporting Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank,
832 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1987); Recon Optical, Inc. v. Israel, 816 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1987);
Foxboro Co. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 805 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1986); Intraworld Indus., Inc.
v. Girard Trust Bank, 336 A.2d 316 (Pa. 1975); Philipp Bros. v. Oil Country Specialists,
Ltd., 787 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1990). The rule in other jurisdictions is equally protective of
the abstract obligation. See, e.g., Bank of N.S. v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., [1987]
D.L.R.4th 161; United Trading Corp. v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. (C.A.
1945). For the best articulation of the opposing view, see Alces, supra note 12.
17. The standby credit issuer in the transaction illustrated supra note 1 must pay
the seller even though the buyer has a contract defense to that payment, e.g., if the goods
do not conform. See, e.g., Ground Air Transfer, Inc. v. Westates Airlines, Inc., 899 F.2d
1269 (1st Cir. 1990). Conversely, if the buyer does not owe the invoice price to the seller
in the transaction illustrated supra note 1, the surety should not pay the seller. See
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 34 (1995).
1999]
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Traditional guaranties," by distinction, are first and foremost secondary to
the underlying transaction. In theory and in practice, the obligor on the guaranty
(the issuer of the guaranty) need not pay the guaranty beneficiary unless the
circumstances of the underlying transaction dictate it. Thus, in this discussion
the term "guaranty" refers to undertakings such as bonds and other suretyship
arrangements whereby the party issuing the "guaranty" is obligated to pay the
beneficiary of the "guaranty" only after the beneficiary establishes the fact of a
loss, breach, or other default of a principal obligor.
The balance of this part addresses the question whether this distinction is
merely formal, and therefore insufficient to justify denial of the subrogation
remedy, or whether it supports different treatment of the two commercial
devices. The overall analysis suggests that the distinction is an approximation
that holds in many cases. The better reasoning concludes, however, that the
distinction by itself is insufficient, and that, in any event, Revised Article 5 now
interdicts it. Professor Amy Boss has provided the analytical framework. 9
In her article on abstract obligations and subrogation, Boss argued that the
abstract obligation functions as a commercial form of guaranty2" and that
subrogation rules in abstract obligation law should conform to subrogation rules
in guaranty law. Boss proposed that the National Conference of Commissioners
18. There has been a measure of promiscuity in the use and spelling of the term
"guaranty." In international trade and in foreign banking, parties use "guarantees" that
are primary undertakings. Variously referred to as "international bank guarantees [sic],"
"first demand guarantees," and "primary guarantees," these obligations are primary in
nature and are generally governed by the law of letters of credit rather than the law of
suretyship, the traditional law of secondary guaranties. (Note that international bankers
use the foreign spelling of the term). For cases applying abstract obligation principles
to these guarantees, see, e.g, American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l,
583 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Banque Paribas v.
Hamilton Indus. Int'l, 767 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985); Esal (Commodities) Ltd. v. Oriental
Credit Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 546 (C.A. 1985); Society of Lloyd's v. Canadian Imperial
Bank, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 579 (Q.B. 1993). See generally Borris Kozolchyk, Bank
Guarantees and Letters of Credit: Time for a Return to the Fold, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus.
L. 1 (1989); Omar, The Regulation of International First Demand Bonds-A
Comparative Approach, 4 ARAB L.Q. 95 (1989); Jean Stoufflet, Recent Developments
in the Law ofinternational Bank Guarantees in France and Belgium, 2 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 48 (1987). In this Article and in most of the commentary cited here, the term
guaranty (however spelled), refers to a secondary obligation generally subject to
suretyship principles.
19. The Boss article examines the mechanistic analysis in the abstract obligation
context. George Palmer reaches a similar conclusion in subrogation law as a general
principle, criticizing mechanistic application of the primary/secondary distinction as
turning "a description of one of the common instances of subrogation into a definition
and in the process ignoring the reason why there is subrogation in the common instance."
1 PALMER, supra note 4, at 252.
20. "[O]ne possible way to view letters of credit is as a mere commercial form of
guaranty... ." Boss, supra note 12, at 1136.
[Vol. 64
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on Uniform State Laws2 provide explicitly in Revised Article 5 that, post
payment, subrogation be widely available for parties to the abstract obligation
transaction' and to the underlying and related transactions, 23 though she urged
21. At the time she wrote, the revision of Article 5 was a project of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (hereinafter "the Conference"),
and Boss directed her recommendation to the Conference draffing committee to which
she was an advisor. See Boss, supra note 12, at 1134-35.
22. See Boss, supra note 12, at 1090. Although Boss does not attempt to address
all of them, there are a significant number of situations in which parties to the abstract
obligation transaction (e.g., the applicant, the issuer, the beneficiary, the confirming
bank, and the account party) may seek subrogation. To date there are no reported cases
involving efforts by the issuer to subrogate itself to the rights of the applicant against the
beneficiary or against third parties, but some commentators support such a claim in a
proper case. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS, AND
CREDIT CARDS 14.11 [2][a] (rev. ed. 1995); Douglas Baird, Standby Letters of Credit
in Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 130, 140 (1982); Jarvis, supra note 5; Gerald T.
McLaughlin, Letters of Credit as Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy, 50 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1033, 1073 (1982). There is case law recognizing an action by the issuer to
subrogate itself to the beneficiary's rights against the applicant or the applicant's
property. See CCF, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Slamans), 175 B.1L 762
(N.D. Okla. 1994), rev'd, 69 F.3d 468 (10th Cir. 1995); cf. In re Valley Vue Joint
Venture, 123 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (subrogating applicant to rights of
beneficiary). But cf. Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968
F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1992) (denying issuer subrogation claim to bond proceeds assigned by
beneficiary to third party). Most courts have rejected subrogation of the issuer to the
rights of the beneficiary on one ground or another. See, e.g., Berliner Handels-Und
Frankfurter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re East Tex. Steel Facilities), 117
B.R. 235 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel
Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 89 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re
Munzenrieder, 58 B.R. 228 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v.
Economic Enters., Inc. (In re Economic Enters., Inc.), 44 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1984); Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper Co., 907 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1995). There is also
authority permitting the confirming bank to subrogate itself to the rights of the issuer
against the applicant, see Chemical Bank v. Craig, 826 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1987), and to
subrogate itself to the rights of the beneficiary against the applicant, see FDIC v. Liberty
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1986). For authority that the applicant
may subrogate itself to the rights of the beneficiary, see In re Minnesota Kicks, Inc., 48
B.R. 93 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). But cf Wilkins v. Commercial Inv. Trust Corp., 153
F.3d 1273 (1lth Cir. 1998) (denying subrogation to applicant seeking lien rights of
parties who received credit proceeds from beneficiary); Tokyo Kogyo Shokai v. U.S.
Nat'l Bank, 126 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying subrogation of applicant to issuer's
rights against bank nominated to make advances under red clause credit); North Am.
Foreign Trading Corp. v. Chiao Tung Bank, No. 95 Civ. 5189(LBS), 1997 WL 193197,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1997) (denying negotiating bank's claim in nature of
subrogation to beneficiary's rights against applicant in underlying transaction).
23. Professor Boss, for example, would extend subrogation benefits to the
confirming bank against the applicant for the credit. See Boss, supra note 12, at 1132.
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that the remedy be available only after the obligor has paid the abstract
obligation. To an extent, the Conference complied.24
The Boss article made a number of telling points. Boss confronted the
unhappy state in case law: Several decisions used mechanistic analysis to
determine whether to apply subrogation. These cases reasoned that since an
abstract obligation issuer always pays its own obligation-a characterization of
the issuer's obligation that is consistent with the independence principle that
drives much of abstract obligation law-there could be no subrogation.25 The
cases were telling parties that issued abstract obligations that they could not have
the benefits of the independence principle without the costs. The cases reasoned
that if the credit is independent, as issuers have vigorously argued,26 the issuer
paying the beneficiary satisfies its own obligation, not the debtor's obligation,
and the issuer may not have subrogation.
Boss rejected this analysis, which she saw as a rhetorical distinction that did
not support denial of subrogation for abstract obligations on the one hand and the
application of subrogation for guaranties on the other. Much of the discussion
in the cases, as Boss demonstrated, turned on two distinctions between abstract
obligations27 and secondary guaranties:28 (1) the idea that the abstract obligation
Professor James J. White, the reporter for Revised Article 5, would also extend it to
confirmers. See James J. White, Rights of Subrogation in Letters of Credit Transactions,
41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 47, 60 (1996).
24. Under U.C.C. Section 5-117 (1995) the Conference did not directly give the
issuer a right of subrogation, but it did remove from the subrogation inquiry the notion
that an abstract obligation issuer may never have subrogation. For further discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 71-86.
25. Generally, however, the cases arose in bankruptcy courts where the federal law
of bankruptcy governed. See In re Agrownautics, Inc., 125 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1991); Beach v. First Union Nat'l Bank (In re Carley Capital Group), 119 B.R. 646
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel Corp.
(In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 89 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re Munzenrieder, 58
B.R. 228 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Economic Enters.,
Inc. (In re Economic Enters., Inc.), 44 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
26. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS arts. 3 & 4 (1993) (hereinafter "UCP 500");
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM RULES FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES
art. 2(b) (1992) (hereinafter "URDG"); INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW AND PRACTICE,
INC., INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACTICES rule 1.06(c) (1998) (hereinafter "ISP 98").
The first two of these is a product of the International Chamber of Commerce Banking
Commission. The Commission vetted and approved the third. All three regimes support
the assertion in the text. Banks are the moving force behind UCP 500 and the URDG,
both of which affirm the independence of abstract undertakings.
27. Much of the Boss article and other commentary refers to standby letters of
credit, which in U.S. commerce are the abstract obligation paradigm.
28. The guaranty in question is generally that of the surety industry, for it is to
sureties that standby credit issuers are similar, as the title of the Boss article suggests.
See Boss, supra note 12.
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is independent of the underlying obligation or "primary" while the secondary
guaranty is dependent on the underlying obligation or "secondary," and (2) the
parallel notion that the abstract obligation issuer satisfies its own debt when it
pays the beneficiary while the guarantor satisfies the debt of another when it
pays the beneficiary. In fact, the Boss article demonstrated that the two
arguments are really one and that the conflated arguments do not by themselves
justify the exclusion of subrogation in the abstract obligation context.
B. The Primary/Secondary Distinction29
Subrogation law customarily distinguishes primary and secondary
obligations and affords subrogation in the latter case but not in the former.
Similarly, the banking industry distinguishes its product, the standby, from the
fidelity industry's bonds and other guaranties on the ground that the former is a
primary undertaking independent of any underlying transaction while the latter
are secondary, being derivative of rights in the underlying transaction.
Boss demonstrated that this distinction failed to justify a denial of
subrogation to the abstract obligation issuer.30 She concluded that the nub of the
law's distinction between abstract obligations and secondary guaranties is one
of maintaining the independence principle, the principle that the abstract
obligation issuer must pay upon the benefieiary's presentation of documents
29. While the distinction may not be persuasive in the subrogation controversy, the
distinction is relevant in the bank regulatory setting. "The true test is whether an
instrument is an independent rather than an accessory or suretyship undertaking." Sue
E. Auerbach, Comment ofNew OCCIR. 7.1016, LETTER OF CREDIT UPDATE, Nov. 1996,
at 22. Banking authorities are rightly concerned under current versions of banking law
that banks engage in banking practices which fall within the scope of their charter and
not insurance or fidelity company practices which do not fall within that scope. Section
24 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 524 (Supp. 111 1997), limits nationally
chartered banks to the "business of banking." The issuance of primary undertakings, or
abstract obligations, has long been the business of banking; the issuance of secondary
obligations in which the bank has no interest, generally has not. See Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Ruling, 12 C.F.R. § 7.1016 (1998) (governing
the issuance of "independent undertakings"); 12 C.F.R. § 7.1017 (1998) (limiting the
issuance of secondary guaranties). By virtue of its primary nature, moreover, bank
regulators treat the standby letter of credit as an unfunded loan, and insist that banks
include it in their loan limit calculations. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(f) (McKinney
1990); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Lending Limits, 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(f(iv)
(1998). Bank regulators also require bank issuers to issue abstract obligations only after
proper credit analysis of the bank's reimbursement right. See Comptroller of the
Currency, Interpretive Ruling, 12 C.F.R. § 7.1016(b)(iv) (1998).
30. The Boss article generally confines analysis of subrogation in the context of
the issuer's efforts to subrogate itself to the rights of the beneficiary. The thesis of the
article is broader, however, advancing subrogation generally in the abstract obligation
transaction. See Boss, supra note 12, at 1128-33.
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without regard to the equities of related transactions. Because that concern is a
pre-payment concern and because subrogation is a post-payment adjustment,
Boss concluded that the law can maintain the independence principle without
regard to subrogation.3 From that conclusion Boss advanced the view that
subrogation is good for the abstract obligation transaction if equity's
prerequisites for subrogation are satisfied,32 and that abstract obligations should
be subject to the subrogation remedy as a matter of abstract obligation law.
It is not sufficient to conclude that there are no justifications for rejecting
subrogation in the abstract obligation transaction simply because these
mechanical or rhetorical justifications fail. Nor is it sufficient to conclude that
absent well articulated justifications for excluding subrogation, subrogation
should apply. The proper inquiry is one of determining whether subrogation fits
the abstract obligation transaction, not whether current justifications are adequate
or inadequate. The Boss article set out to demolish current justifications for
excluding subrogation, and it accomplished that goal. But it did not set out to
examine the justifications for including subrogation. It is the thesis of this
Article that those who propose to include subrogation must make a case for this
special remedy and further that, most of the time, they cannot make it.
31. The Boss argument that the primary/secondary distinction should not be
determinative finds support from restitution scholars, who although they do not address
the question of subrogation in the abstract obligation context, sharply criticize, in the
words of one of them, transmuting "the description of one of the common instances of
subrogation into a definition." 1 PALMER, supra note 4, at 31; see also GOFF & JONES,
supra note 4, at 527 (arguing that the narrowest principle one can advance for situations
in which subrogation is apposite is the situation in which reason and justice demand it).
32. Sometimes, in abstract payment obligation transactions, though infrequently
in the standby credit transaction, there is a confirmer, i.e., a second bank that "confirms"
the obligation of the issuer. The confirmer's liability runs directly to the beneficiary. See
U.C.C. § 5-107(a) (1995). The illustration of the abstract payment transaction supra note




Boss would give the confirming bank subrogation to the issuer's rights against the
applicant, even though the confirmer has not-relied on the applicant's credit and may not
have known the applicant at the time the confirner undertook to pay the beneficiary. See
Boss, supra note 12, at 1132-33. Boss acknowledges, however, that whether subrogation
should be available in all situations "may turn on" equitable distinctions that the cases
have generally ignored. See Boss, supra note 12, at 1128. Boss's article, however, does
not note any instances in which she believes subrogation should be denied.
[V'ol. 64
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IV. LOOKING FOR UNJUST ENRICHmENT
Analysis of the abstract obligation transaction illustrates that unjust
enrichment usually is not present in the abstract obligation setting. Comparison
of the abstract obligation transaction's dynamics with subrogation and its
dynamics without subrogation demonstrates, moreover, that subrogation is
harmful to the abstract obligation as a commercial device. This analysis
concludes that there are valid commercial reasons for limiting subrogation in the
abstract obligation context, namely, that subrogation (1) offends the reason for
subrogation-the prevention of unjust enrichment, and (2) yields commercially
harmful effects, not the least of which is a diminishing of the independence
principle's practical force.
Virtually all who have considered subrogation in the abstract obligation
context agree that the law can in no event permit an abstract obligation issuer to
enjoy subrogation rights before payment.33 Boss takes pains to make that point.'
The dissent in Tudor Development Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.,35 a leading case that an Article 5 comment indorses, makes it;36
the subrogation provision of Revised Article 5 makes it;37 the comments
emphasize it;38 and Professor White, the reporter for Revised Article 5,
emphasizes it.
39
By making this concession, these authorities acknowledge that the existence
of subrogation rights before payment could diminish the effectiveness of the
abstract obligation. One court'so aphorism captures an essential difference
between the abstract payment obligation and the guaranty, the "pay now, argue
later" rule.' This "pay now, argue later" rule explains the law's insistence that
33. Careful parsing of the facts of cases denying subrogation may well reveal an
absence of unjust enrichment and, therefore, no grounds for subrogation. In principle,
then, the courts may have reached the correct result, but Boss is correct that often the
opinions facially resort to the rhetorical distinction she finds unhelpful. See generally
supra note 22 (citing cases).
34. See Boss, supra note 12, at 1117-19.
35. 968 F.2d 357, 368 (3d Cir. 1992).
36. Id. at 368 (Becker, J., dissenting).
37. The subrogation provision begins with the critical words: "An issuer that
honors .... ." U.C.C. § 5-117(a) (1995).
38. U.C.C. § 5-117 cmt. 2 (1995)
39. See White, supra note 23, at 61 ("It is important, therefore, that the courts
maintain their hostility to an issuer or an applicant that seeks to be subrogated to another
when the issuer has not paid.").
40. Eakin v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 875 F.2d 114, 116 (7th Cir.
1989).
41. Under secondary guaranty law, because payment under the guaranty depends
upon underlying contract obligations, the guarantor/surety need not pay until it is clear
that its principal in the underlying transaction owes the money. Hence, for guaranties,
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abstract obligations maintain independence from the underlying transaction42 and
justifies the private bargaining of commercial parties who between themselves
decide whether to use the "pay now, argue later" product or the "argue now, pay
later" product. In short, the authorities, the drafters of Revised Article 5, and the
dissent in a leading subrogation case, seem to be saying that if subrogation
weakens the independence of the abstract obligation, they would withhold it.
They withhold it before payment because to grant it then weakens the
independence.
Allowing pre-payment subrogation obviously weakens the independence
principle. If an abstract obligation issuer receives conforming documents from
the beneficiary asking for payment under the credit, the abstract obligation
rules43 and Revised Article 544 insist that the issuer pay. The issuer may not raise
defenses that arise out of the underlying transaction,45 usually may not assert
the rule is "argue now, pay later." In the abstract obligation context, however, the
obligor/issuer pays without regard to underlying transaction equities because the abstract
payment obligation is independent of the underlying transaction. Only after payment do
the beneficiary (the seller) and the applicant (the buyer) adjust their positions. See, e.g.,
Recon Optical, Inc. v. Israel., 816 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1987). Hence for abstract
obligations, the rule is "pay now, argue later."
42. Courts generally have been mindful of the distinction. If a bank undertaking
is intimately related to the underlying transaction, it strays "too far from the basic
purpose of letters of credit, namely providing a means of assuring payment cheaply by
eliminating the need for the issuer to police the underlying contract," and courts simply
treat it as a secondary guaranty. Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publ'g Co. v. Pacific Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974). The issue generally arises in the context of
nondocumentary conditions for payment under the obligation. Wichita holds that if the
obligation is payable against nondocumentary conditions that are important to the
obligation rather than incidental to it, the obligation is dependent rather than independent,
and the law of abstract obligations is not suitable to it. This rule illustrates the fact that,
arguably, it is not law but commercial realities that determine the abstract nature of an
obligation. Accord Calumet Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 83 C 2141, 1983 LEXIS
14465 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 1983); Mayhill Homes Corp. v. Family Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 324 S.E.2d 340 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Western Petroleum Co. v. First Bank
Aberdeen, N.A., 367 N.W.2d 773 (S.D. 1985); cf Universal Say. Ass'n v. Killeen Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 757 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (permitting issuers to accept
documentary evidence that nondocumentary condition is satisfied); Banque De
L'Indochine Et De Suez S.A. v. J'- Rayner Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 228 (1983 C.A.).
Revised Article 5 codifies Wichita's sensible, commercial rule. Section 5-102(a)(10)
defines "letter of credit" to include only undertakings that satisfy "the requirements of
Section 5-104." Section 5-104 stipulates that the obligation must be independent of
underlying contracts or arrangements. See also U.C.C. § 5-102 cmt. 6 (1995).
43. See UCP 500, supra note 26, art. 9(a); URDG, supra note 26, art. 2(b); ISP 98,
supra note 26, rule 2.01.
44. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (1995); cf UN CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
45. See, e.g., Asociacion De Azucareros De Guatamala v. United States Nat'l
Bank, 423 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank &
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setoff rights against the beneficiary,4 6 and often may not raise public policy
issues relating to the underlying transaction.4 ' To allow the issuer to raise
subrogation rights against the beneficiary before payment would be a serious
departure from these concerted efforts to make the issuer pay against conforming
documents. Any other rule would render the abstract obligation an "argue-now,
pay later" device, that is, a secondary guaranty.
Those who support post-payment application of the subrogation remedy
have taken the position that it does not affect the independence of the
obligation.4" As a matter of courthouse practice, they may be correct, but as a
matter of banking house practice, they are not. The problem with subrogation
is that at any time it weakens the independence of the credit. By ignoring the
dynamics of banking practice and relying on trial practice, the authorities have
missed the point. While it is true that substantive legal rules can prevent bank
issuers from seeking the subrogation remedy at the courthouse until the issuer
pays, those rules cannot prevent the bank issuer from calculating the remedy's
benefits when the issuer decides at the banking house whether to pay the
beneficiary.49
Trust Co., 378 A.2d 562 (Conn. 1977); Philipp Bros. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 787
S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1990). To apply underlying contract defenses to the letter of credit
obligation would violate "the whole fabric of letter-of-credit law." Boss, supra note 12,
at 1095.
46. Power Curber Int'l Ltd. v. National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K., 3 All E.R. 607
(C.A. 1981). This anti-setoff applies if the setoff arises out of a related transaction, but
does not apply if the issuer is setting off a debt due the issuer from the beneficiary. See,
e.g., FDIC v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1986); Bamberger
Polymers Int'l Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 477 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
47. See, e.g., Berman v. LeBeau Inter-American, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Jupiter Orrington Corp. v. Zweifel, 469 N.E.2d 590 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
48. See, e.g., Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Corp., 968
F.2d 357, 367 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dissenting) ("The drafters' concern about
importing the law of guaranty was not about subrogation, but about eroding the
independence principle (which, as I shall explain in the next section, is not compromised
by allowing subrogation)."). "Once the issuer had [paid the beneficiary], however, as
[the issuer] has here, the purpose of the independence principle has been served: the
beneficiary has the money." Id. at 368. "It is difficult to see, however, how allowing
subrogation once payment has been made by the issuer or party seeking subrogation will
interfere with the operation of letters of credit as swift and certain payment mechanisms."
Boss, supra note 12, at 1121.
49. In a number of cases, bank issuers of letters of credit have resorted to
interpleader, declaratory judgment, or other procedural devices to delay paying
beneficiaries until disputes, usually arising out of the underlying transaction, are
resolved. See, e.g., Unifirst Fed. Say. Bank v. American Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 208 (8th Cir.
1990) (issuer's declaratory judgment action); Johnson v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., 789 F.2d
601 (7th Cir. 1986) (attempt by issuer to interplead). The cases are numerous and are
collected at JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERs OF CREDIT 11.07 (rev. ed. 1996)
(hereinafter DOLAN, LETTERS OF CREDIT). Such conduct by issuers corrodes the
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A. The Effect of Subrogation on the Independence
ofAbstract Obligations
The chief practical, commercial distinction between the abstract obligation
and the secondary guaranty lies in the fact that in the former, the issuer pays
before the beneficiary establishes the fact of default,"° while in the latter the
beneficiary must establish the fact of default before the guarantor pays. In
practice, when the parties to the underlying transaction dispute the question of
default, the difference is critical. Under the abstract obligation, the beneficiary
will litigate with the funds; under the secondary guaranty it will litigate without
them. Under the abstract obligation, the beneficiary often will have the benefit
of a convenient forum; under the secondary guaranty, it may lose that benefit.
The distinctions are important not only in the international context where
abstract obligations often operate," but also in domestic transactions. The
independence of the obligation; and some courts, but only a few, have reacted with a
measure of impatience. See, e.g., Eakin v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 875
F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1989) (entering judgment for face amount of credit against issuer that
originally sought declaratory relief and denying issuer recoupment that would have been
available absent its suit); Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Dev. Corp., 686
S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (denying issuer's interpleader and using interpleaded
facts to enter summary judgment against issuer). Cf Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic
Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980) (awarding damages in the nature of penalty, even
though appellant did not ask for them, against issuer that took frivolous appeal). For
another case in which an issuer apparently dishonored and then used settlement
negotiations to obtain an assignment from the beneficiary, see First State Bank & Trust
Co. v. McIver, 893 F.2d 301 (11 th Cir. 1990).
50. The standby credit, of course, covers situations in addition to those involving
default, but the default model illustrates the point.
51. The standby letter of credit was originally a domestic banking innovation. It
has found its way, however, into international sales, see, e.g., Frame v. S-H, Inc., 967
F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1992); Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 643 F.
Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Vincent M. Maullella, Uncorking the Letter of Credit for
Quicker Export Collections, CORPORATE CASHFLOW, Feb. 1989, reprinted in LETTER OF
CREDIT UPDATE, Oct. 1989, at 42. The independent guarantee, however, tends to
predominate in the international setting, though it appears under various guises. See RD
Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd., 2 All E.R. 862 (Q.B.
1997) ("first demand guarantees"); Bolivinter Oil S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 1
Lloyd's Rep. 251 (C.A. 1984) ("performance guarantees"); Egon Gutman, Bank
Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit: Moving Toward a Unifonn Approach, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 167 (1990). The standby and the independent guarantee are generally
subject to the same law, namely, the law of abstract obligations; but the form of the two
devices is quite different. For illustrations of typical standby credits, see DOLAN,
LETTERS OF CREDIT, supra note 49, at app. E., docs. 14, 15, 16, & 18. For an illustration
of a bank guarantee form, see BERTRAMS, supra note 13, at 379-86.
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advantages, furthermore, are plain to the commercial parties, and one must
assume that they structured their arrangement with regard to these advantages.52
When the authorities contend that the subrogation remedy should apply
only post-payment, they are acknowledging these practical distinctions and are
making allowance for them. Yet, once the law accommodates subrogation, even
post-payment, issuers and confirmers will act on that possibility, not in every
case, but in some cases. The possibility of post-payment subrogation will tempt
the credit issuer to dishonor even when it knows it should pay and will alter the
practical pre-payment dynamics of the abstract obligation. Credit issuer
dishonor, moreover, alters the structure of the abstract obligation transaction,
misallocating the risks and advantages the parties have allocated by their
bargain. The mere possibility of the subrogation remedy corrodes the
independence of the abstract obligation, diminishes its practical benefit, and
moves the obligation along the continuum from abstract obligation to secondary
guaranty.
This is not to say that subrogation should never lie in abstract obligation
transactions but that it should lie only after consideration of these commercial
imperatives in light of the claimant's assertion that it has unjustly enriched the
defendant. Nor is it to say that subrogation will wreck the abstract obligation's
viability as a commercial device. The premier feature of the abstract obligation
is not the law that supports it; it is the persistence of abstract obligation issuers'
tradition of keeping it independent. Presumably, the market will reward issuers
that decline to engage in the strategic behavior that a wide application of the
subrogation remedy invites.53
52. Foxboro Co. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 805 F.2d 34 (lst Cir. 1986), is a classic
example of court protection (ultimately) of the commercial function of a simple-demand
guarantee. In Foxboro, the guarantee permitted a foreign buyer to recover funds before
the parties settled their underlying dispute. The trial court saw the buyer/beneficiary's
draw under the guarantee as an attempt to obtain strategic advantage in the settlement
negotiations and, in an opinion replete with harsh language and flashes of judicial
impatience, enjoined the beneficiary's draw. Foxboro Co. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 634
F. Supp. 1226 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 805 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1986). The opinion of the court
of appeals makes it quite clear that the court recognized (1) that, indeed, the buyer was
using the guarantee to obtain an advantage in the settlement negotiations and (2) that the
obvious purpose of the guarantee was to give the beneficiary such advantage. Unwilling
to reallocate advantages and disadvantages agreed to by the parties, the court of appeals
dissolved the injunction and reversed, the trial court's displeasure notwithstanding. See
Foxboro, 805 F.2d at 34.
53. The market might save the standby as a commercial product, but it might not
save the beneficiary in a multi-million dollar transaction when the applicant is insolvent.
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B. The Independence ofAbstract Obligations with Subrogation
The problem with subrogation in abstract obligation transactions lies in its
effect on issuer behavior. When an abstract obligation issuer receives
conforming documents from the beneficiary, the issuer should pay
notwithstanding the equities of the underlying transaction. There are times, of
course, when the issuer would choose not to pay, usually because the applicant
is insolvent or is unwilling to reimburse. In such cases, the issuer prefers to avail
itself of the applicant's defenses in the underlying transaction to the beneficiary's
claim, but the independence principle teaches that those defenses are not
available to the issuer. Similarly, if the issuer dishonors, the independence
principle prevents the issuer from raising defenses and from seeking
subrogation. 4 If the issuer refuses to pay when presented with complying
documents, it is liable to the beneficiary for the face amount of the credit plus
interest, attorneys' fees, and incidental damages."
The beneficiary will not, however, keep the money it receives under the
credit from the issuer indefinitely. If there are defenses in the underlying
transaction, the applicant will likely sue the beneficiary for breach of contract or
other cause of action and recover all or part of the payment.56 That suit,
however, should occur while the beneficiary enjoys the advantages of holding
the money during litigation and may require the applicant to sue in a distant
forum. In short, by virtue of the independence principle, the bank pays first and
the parties argue later.
An issuer facing possible loss of reimbursement will be tempted to dishonor
and raise the applicant's defenses by way of subrogation in the ensuing
litigation. It is true that these defenses are not defenses to payment under the
credit and that the remedy of subrogation does not arise until the issuer pays the
beneficiary, but it will take a disciplined court to deprive the issuer of
subrogation when the beneficiary sues for what has the appearance of a
judgment that will unjustly enrich the beneficiary. An illustration is instructive
here.
On May 1, on the application of New York Seller Company ("Seller"), First
National Bank ("Bank") issued a $10,000,000 abstract obligation in favor of
54. "[A]n issuer may not dishonor and then defend its dishonor or assert a setoff
on the ground that it is subrogated to another person's rights." U.C.C. § 5-117 cmt. 2
(1995).
55. U.C.C. § 5-11 l(a), (d), (e) (1995). As a general rule, in the standby context,
courts do not look to the underlying transaction to determine damages. See, e.g., Eakin
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 875 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1989); Airline
Reporting Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 832 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1987).
56. For cases in which applicants have sought recovery in the underlying
transaction after payment by the issuer, see e.g., Kiva Constr. & Eng'g, Inc. v.
International Fidelity Ins. Co., 961 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1992); Wood v. R.R. Donnelley
& Sons Co., 888 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Foreign Government Buyer ("Buyer"), a Middle Eastern governmental
enterprise that was purchasing electrical generating equipment from Seller. The
credit was to provide Buyer with security for return of its fifty-percent advance
payment to Seller upon the occurrence of certain events specified in the sales
contract. On May 2, war erupted in Buyer's country. Buyer repudiated the sales
contract and made a conforming demand on Bank, arguing that the force majeure
clause of the sales contract applied, terminating the contract and entitling Buyer
to a full return of its advance payment. Seller argued that the force majeure
clause did not cover the eventuality of war and did not obligate Seller to return
the payment.
In a guaranty setting, these arguments are critical to Bank's decision to pay.
A guarantor, being secondarily liable and having issued an undertaking
dependent on facts in the underlying transaction, should assess these arguments
before it pays or dishonors and may litigate them prior to payment. Because
Buyer knew that guaranty law might force it to litigate underlying transaction
issues in a New York court, it refused to accept a guaranty. Instead, Buyer
insisted on the abstract obligation, assuming that it could obtain return of its
advances without having to litigate in New York,5 7 and Buyer used its
negotiating strength with Seller to exact the agreement. Both Seller and Buyer
knew that one party would hold the funds during a potential dispute and knew
that one party would have to sue in a foreign jurisdiction.58 Had the parties
elected to use a secondary guaranty, Buyer would have shouldered these costs.
Under the abstract obligation they selected, Seller assumed them.59
57. Commercial parties may use abstract payment obligations, rather than
guarantees, for the further reason that the abstract payment obligation usually costs less
than the guaranty. The issuer of a standby credit, for example, decides whether to pay
on the basis of document examination at the banking house, a quick and inexpensive
process. The guarantor/surety, however, must investigate the facts of the underlying
transaction, determine the amount of the obligation, and often, conduct the inquiry off
premises, before it can know whether to pay. See MCGUrJNESS, supra note 13, 12.102.
58. An arbitration provision in the underlying transaction may select a forum for
arbitration. In that case, a preliminary injunction in New York negates the forum
selection clause. For a case that illustrates this unfortunate effect of interlocutory
interference by the courts, see Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 336 A.2d 316
(Pa. 1975). Even if the arbitration clause provides for arbitration in New York, the
applicable law at the injunction hearing might differ from that in the agreement. And,
in any event, the beneficiary will not hold the proceeds of the credit in injunction
litigation but will hold them during the arbitration if a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction does not issue. There is considerable authority indicating that
courts are aware of this feature of independent undertakings and take steps to protect it.
See, e.g., Trans Meridian Trading, Inc. v. Empresa Nacional De Comercializacion De
Insumos, 829 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1987); Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1985); American Export Group Int'l Servs.,
Inc. v. Salem M. AL-NISF Elec. Co., 661 F. Supp. 759 (D.D.C. 1987).
59. These disadvantages do not disappear, and someone has to bear them. The
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On May 3, Seller becomes insolvent, and Bank must decide whether to pay
under the credit. If subrogation is not available to Bank, it will be inclined to
pay because failure to pay will make it liable for the face amount of the credit,
interest, and attorneys' fees. Bank will have no recourse, furthermore, for its
failure to assess Seller's credit adequately other than to file a claim in Seller's
insolvency proceedings.
If subrogation is available, Bank will be able to raise Seller's underlying
contract claim against Buyer. Bank will have an incentive to confront the
beneficiary-Buyer because both Bank and Buyer know that Bank can eventually
raise Seller's force majeure argument. Bank might, for instance, threaten to
dishonor unless the beneficiary agrees to take half of the claimed amount. This
incentive disappears, however, if Bank has no opportunity to seek subrogation
because the law gives it no rights against the beneficiary and will render it liable
for the beneficiary's attorneys' fees in addition to the face amount of the credit.
When subrogation is available, however, the possible addition of attorneys' fees
to the beneficiary's damage claim, although a disincentive for Bank to dishonor,
would probably not be sufficient to overcome the more powerful incentive to
dishonor that is present when the subrogation remedy is available.
This same invitation to act strategically arises even if Bank calculates that
a court would award judgment against it but allow Bank to sue the beneficiary
later, perhaps in a different court or forum, to recover its payment of a judgment
on the grounds that it unjustly enriched the beneficiary. Although it is true that
bank credit issuers should not dishonor facially complying presentations (and
that they are liable if they do), the potential for subrogation will provide a bank
that is intent on dishonoring with comfort. The following example illustrates the
way the subrogation would have to work in order to deny the dishonoring bank
that comfort.First, the beneficiary would sue the bank for wrongful dishonor. When the
bank raises the applicant's defense, the court must strike the defense as
inadequate because the bank has yet to pay, and, under the universal view,
subrogation is available only after payment. The court would presumably enter
judgment against the defenseless bank, and the bank would then satisfy the
judgment by paying the beneficiary. At that point, the bank, as subrogee of the
applicant's rights, would bring suit, perhaps in a different forum, against the
beneficiary for breach or fraud in the underlying transaction. The court in that
suit would enter judgment against the beneficiary and in favor of the bank, and
the beneficiary would satisfy that judgment by paying the bank the same amount,
perhaps with interest differentials, that the bank paid the beneficiary under the
parties can apportion them, however. By creating a contract requirement that the advance
pa jment not be secured by any obligation, the parties would allocate the cost fully to the
buyer. By securing return of the advance payment to the extent of 50%, they have
allocated the costs one-half to the seller, one-half to the buyer. There are an infinite
number of possible allocations, but all of this is for the commercial parties to decide
when they negotiate the terms of their relationship.
[Vol. 64
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/2
SUBROGATIONAND ABSTRACT OBLIGATIONS
first judgment. It is hard to believe that many U.S. courts will find this
circuitous litigation appealing.60
That is not to say that subrogation for the issuer will destroy abstract
obligations in commerce. It will not, but it will corrode them. That fact is worth
considering when an issuer seeks subrogation. Nor is it to say that the presence
of a subrogation remedy will produce wide-scale dishonor by issuers. An
abstract obligation issuer with an international presence may be zealous in
protecting its reputation and unwilling to engage in conduct that will render its
obligations less acceptable in the markets. But the presence of the subrogation
remedy will corrode the independence, and even large issuers with strong
reputations will succumb from time to time, as they have with other legal devices
that corrode the independence of the obligation. Remedies for fraud in abstract
obligation transactions are the foremost threat to the independence of these
obligations, and courts have wisely fashioned strong limits on those remedies,
61
as Revised Article 5 has done.62 The courts should also fashion limits for the
subrogation remedy for the same reason: The Subrogation remedy threatens the
independence of the obligation. The unjust enrichment prerequisite for the
subrogation remedy is the chief limiting device.
In short, the theory that the subrogation defense will apply only in the post-
payment setting fails when a credit issuer, at its own instance or the instance of
an applicant or other party, elects to use the club that subrogation grants it, be it
a pre-payment or a post-payment weapon. In fact, post-payment subrogation
provides an incentive for an issuer to engage in such behavior.63 Because that
60. In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Township of Bensalem, No. 96-6804, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8217 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 1997), the issuer successfully used a breach of contract
claim to justify dishonor of its own credit obligation. The beneficiary was supposed to
return the credit to the issuer, instead, the beneficiary drew. A court with proper regard
for the independence principle would have required the issuer to pay the beneficiary and
then would have permitted the issuer to recover the payment. The Township ofBensalem
court, however, granted summary judgment to the issuer in its declaratory judgment suit
against the beneficiary, holding that the issuer owed the beneficiary nothing.
61. The limits include a requirement that the fraud be more than technical fraud;
it must be elevated to the point that the beneficiary is attempting to take the money with
no colorable right to it. See, e.g., Intraworld, 336 A.2d at 325. Professor Ellinger
characterizes the cases as requiring a showing that the beneficiary is acting "without any
shred of honest belief in his rights." Edward Ellinger, Fraud in Documentary Credit
Transactions, 1981 J. Bus. L. 258, 262. The courts, moreover, have fashioned serious
thresholds as a matter of practice against injunctions to stop payment of an abstract
obligation, not the least of which is a showing that there are no adequate remedies at law,
in either the beneficiary's jurisdiction or the applicant's, and a showing of a likelihood
of success on the merits. See, e.g., Trans Meridian Trading, 829 F.2d at 949 (requiring
absence of adequate remedy at law); Recon Optical, Inc. v. Israel, 816 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.
1987) (requiring a showing of likelihood of success on the merits).
62. See U.C.C. § 5-109(b) (1995).
63. See supra note 49 (citing authority).
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behavior weakens the abstract obligation as a commercial device, courts should
be loath to invoke the subrogation remedy, and issuers seeking it should face a
high threshold for establishing unjust enrichment.
These conclusions suggest that given the unsuitability of subrogation to
most abstract obligation situations, the courts construing Revised Article 5 are
best advised to limit the remedy to the narrow situation in which unjust
enrichment facts are patent. That conclusion leaves itself open to the charge that
there is no room for subrogation in the abstract obligation transaction. Yet, there
are instances in which we know that subrogation should lie, and it is premature
to declare that there are not others. We know that sometimes issuers are not in
position to bargain for rights and that to deny subrogation in those cases might
be unfair. 4 An entity that issues an abstract obligation to the holders of a
negotiable instrument or a negotiable bond' cannot negotiate with the
beneficiary before or even after the instrument is uttered. The issuer whose
abstract obligation secures that note or bond does not know who the beneficiary
will be and does not know what unjust enrichment facts might arise.67 Similarly,
an issuer that issues an obligation on behalf of a pool of applicants that changes
over time cannot know what unjust enrichment facts might arise in the
underlying transaction. Such an issuer is not in a position to negotiate with each
applicant as it joins the pool.68 Finally, Professor White69 raises a third
64. The casualty cases and employee fidelity bond cases are examples of situations
in which the surety cannot ex ante take assignments from the parties that will benefit
from its payments. For another, see American Sur. Co. v. Bethlehem Nat'l Bank, 314
U.S. 314, 318-19 (1941) (subrogation of surety to prevent windfall to claimants in failed
bank's receivership).
65. Cf Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 630 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1980)
(credit securing holder of negotiable note).
66. Abstract obligations often secure bond issues. See, e.g., Purvis v. City of Little
Rock, 667 S.W.2d 936 (Ark. 1984); Board of County Comm'rs v. E-470 Public Highway
Auth., 881 P.2d 412 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nicholl
v. E-470 Public Highway Auth., 896 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1995). Cf Comptroller of the
Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 212, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,293 (July 2, 1981) (describing use of standby credit to secure private
placement of securities).
67. Such letters of credit are "general," that is, they do not run to a specified
beneficiary but to a class of beneficiaries. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Currency,
Interpretive Letter No. 536, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
83,247 (Dec. 11, 1990).
68. For illustrations of such arrangements, see Comptroller of the Currency, No-
Objection Letter No. 86-19,[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
84,025 (Oct. 30, 1986); Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 376,
[1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,600 (Oct. 25, 1986);
Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 338, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,508 (May 2, 1985); Comptroller of the Currency,
Interpretive Letter No. 468, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
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possibility when he argues convincingly that in proper circumstances an issuer
might be subrogated to the rights of the applicant under the UCC warranty rule.70
Such a claim is not one parties anticipate when they negotiate a letter of credit
transaction. A breach of warranty claim in these circumstances is akin to a
casualty claim, the kind of claim that traditionally is subject to the subrogation
remedy.
V. THE REACH OF SECTION 5-117
At the time the National Conference on Uniform State Laws was redrafting
UCC Article 5, Professor Boss chaired the ABA Uniform Commercial Code
Committee, was a member of the UCC Permanent Editorial Board, and actively
participated in the Conference's drafting sessions.7' Subsequent to the
publication of her article, the Conference drafting committee adopted Section 5-
117, which addresses subrogation in the abstract obligation context. It would be
naive to think that the Boss arguments had no influence on the drafting process.
In addition, the reporter for Revised Article 5, Professor James White, has
written on the changes he feels Section 5-117 works on the subrogation case law.
His article generally supports the Boss thesis, but with some qualifications.72
Some may assume that Section 5-117 adopts the position that subrogation
should always obtain in abstract obligation transactions. 73 There are two
persuasive reasons for rejecting that assumption. First, the language of the
section itself does not support that reading; and second, such a reading flies in
the face of the traditional prerequisite for subrogation-unjust enrichment. The
section language is plain and unequivocal: In each instance that the section
indorses subrogation, it invokes subrogation law. In each subsection, the
provision references existing subrogation principles rather than fashioning new
subrogation doctrine for abstract obligations. In short, the provision does not
85,692 (Jan. 17, 1989).
69. See White, supra note 23, at 61-64.
70. See U.C.C. § 5-1 10(a)(2) (1995).
71. See U.C.C. art. 5, prefatory note (1995).
72. See White, supra note 23.
73. While the White article assumes that the Section will yield a different result in
many cases that deny subrogation, see White, supra note 23, at 52, 56-60, the article
acknowledges that Section 5-117 does not finish the inquiry. White states:
As we will demonstrate by discussion of the cases, the issuer or applicant who
has been granted the rights of a guarantor by Section 5-117 may still have
many bridges to cross, for there are defenses, exceptions to and limitations
upon a guarantor's subrogation rights and Section 5-117 does not carry the
issuer or applicant across those bridges.
White, supra note 23, at 51. "Judge Becker's dissent amply demonstrates that an issuer,
applicant, or another, who is given a guarantor's rights of subrogation still has many
bridges to cross." White, supra note 23, at 59.
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abrogate the unjust enrichment prerequisite; it abrogates the mechanical line of
authority rejected by Boss that denied subrogation to issuers because an abstract
obligation issuer's undertaking is independent and primary.'
Subsection (a) does not say that an abstract obligation issuer that pays the
debtor's obligation is subrogated to the rights of the beneficiary; it says that the
issuer shall be subrogated "to the same extent as if the issuer were a secondary
obligor of the underlying obligation." Subsections (b) and (c) treat four
additional situations and in each of them the subsections do not grant
subrogation as a matter of course to the identified parties but only grant it "to the
same extent as if the [party] were a secondary obligor."'75
A Comment to the subrogation section indicates that the drafters were also
influenced by the dissent in Tudor Development Group, Inc. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.76 In fact, the Comment, perhaps going beyond the
language of the statute, "indorses" that dissent. 77 In Tudor,78 the majority relied
in part on the analysis Revised Article 5 forbids; that is, denying subrogation in
part because the credit issuer paid its own debt and not the debt of the applicant.
To the extent of that reasoning, the text of revised Section 5-117 implicitly
overturns the majority in Tudor and the Comments explicitly indorse that point
in the dissent.
The Tudor majority made three points, however. The first was the
forbidden point discussed above. The second point was that because subrogation
weakens the independence of the credit, the 1962 version of Article 5 implicitly
74. White says that it addresses the fact that the courts "have drawn the wrong
inference concerning subrogation from the conclusion that a letter of credit obligation is
'primary' whereas the guarantee is 'secondary."' White, supra note 23, at 48.
75. Arguably, Section 5-117 fashions no new statutory law on subrogation.
Commentary in the 1962 version of Article 5 reflects concern similar to that of Section
5-117 that subrogation in abstract obligation cases should not obtain unless the facts of
the case satisfy traditional prerequisites for subrogation. The comments to Section 5-109
of the 1962 version of Article 5 address the possibility of subrogating the issuer to the
applicant's rights against the beneficiary. U.C.C. § 5-109 cmt. (1962). If the beneficiary
of a commercial letter of credit presents complying documents to the issuer, and if the
issuer pays the beneficiary, the applicant may have a cause of action against the
beneficiary whose goods delivered in the underlying contract are defective. The
comment addresses the possibility that the applicant fails to reimburse the issuer and
suggests that in that event the issuer can make a claim against the beneficiary. Id. The
comment notes, however, that the ability of the issuer to maintain the claim rests on the
applicant's assignment to the issuer of its claim against the beneficiary or "in a proper
case subrogation to the rights of the [applicant]." Id. (emphasis added). The highlighted
language suggests that, only if the issuer can show unjust enrichment, would it have
subrogation- the precise effect of the "to the same extent as" language of Section 5-117
in Revised Article 5. U.C.C. § 5-117 (1995).
76. 968 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dissenting).
77. See U.C.C. § 5-117 cmt. 1 (1995).
78. 968 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1992).
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disallows it. This is redolent of the forbidden analysis, and Section 5-117 makes
it clear that Revised Article 5 allows subrogation. Revised Article 5 does not
say, however, that courts engaging in the unjust enrichment inquiry must ignore
the effect of subrogation on the abstract obligation as a commercial product.
Revised Article 5 makes a significant concession to subrogation law when it says
in Section 5-117 and in the Comments that courts may not construe Revised
Article 5 as a rejection of the subrogation remedy in the abstract obligation
context, but Revised Article 5 does not refashion subrogation.
Thus, courts are still free to indulge subrogation law's customary
requirement that a finding of unjust enrichment must precede application of the
subrogation remedy. To the extent that subrogation corrodes the independence
principle, it may be one element in the unjust enrichment calculus. Revised
Article 5 says only that it does not by itself require a court to deny a party
subrogation. Some might be compelled to read Section 5-117's Comment
indorsing the dissent in Tudor as preventing courts from considering the effect
of the remedy on the abstract obligation as a commercial device when they
engage in unjust enrichment analysis. That reading of the Comment would be
more persuasive if there were something in the text of the statute to support it.
There isn't.
79
The third point in Tudor was the unfairness point; that is, the point that it
would be unfair to permit a party to acquire rights after the fact without paying
for them and to the prejudice of third parties when the party did not use its
opportunities to buy those rights at the outset. The plaintiff in Tudor had
acquired ex ante rights in certain bond proceeds and sought to use subrogation
to obtain additional bond proceeds that had been assigned ex ante to another
creditor. The trial court and the appellate court held that the plaintiff could not
have those bond proceeds. The holding is consistent with unjust enrichment
analysis; and, if the Comment indorses the dissent's rejection of that analysis, the
Comment is in direct conflict with the text of Section 5-117. The section
arguably disclaims any attempt to add to the rights of the party seeking
subrogation, ° and the Comment explicitly disclaims any such intention."'
In summary, the drafters did not undertake to remake subrogation law; they
undertook to neuter the mechanistic argument to the extent that the independence
of abstract obligations from the underlying transaction rendered them invariably
inhospitable to subrogation theory. Thus, the drafters validated Boss's
arguments against mechanical analysis, but they did not go beyond that point.
They do not say that subrogation always obtains. They say that courts should
measure the abstract obligation issuer's subrogation claim as they measure the
79. See infra appendix (providing full text).
80. See supra notes 71-89 (discussing the "to the same extent as" language of
Section 5-117 in the text of this Article).
81. "By itself this section does not grant any right of subrogation. It grants only
the right that would exist if the person seeking subrogation 'were a secondary obligor'."
U.C.C. § 5-117 cmt. 1 (1995).
1999]
25
Dolan: Dolan: Study of Subrogation Mostly in Letter of Credit
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
subrogation claim of a secondary party. That measure is one that turns on the
presence of unjust enrichment. Thus, the UCC's jurisprudence is consistent with
traditional subrogation notions.8"
Admittedly, the dissent in Tudor is broader than this reading. The dissent
attacks the mechanistic argument and goes further by arguing that post-payment
subrogation does not damage the independence of the abstract obligation.83
Subpart IV(A) of this Article assesses that contention and finds it refutable, but
the fact remains that the Comment may indorse that feature of the dissent by
implication.
There are two responses to that implicit indorsement. First, the Tudor
dissent spent most of its time attacking the mechanistic argument, and one can
read the Comment as an indorsement of only that feature of the dissent. Second,
the dissent objected to the majority's disposal of the case on summary judgment
without "balancing the equities." 4 Thus, when the Tudor majority denied
subrogation, the dissent did not suggest that subrogation be granted but that the
matter be remanded to see whether equity demanded subrogation. 85 To read the
Comment as indorsing that result is to read it consistently with the language of
Section 5-117, expressed no less that five times, that whether subrogation should
be allowed depends on the law of secondary obligations where an unjust
enrichment inquiry traditionally is essential. Finally, the Comment itself
acknowledges that "[b]y itself this section does not grant any right of
subrogation." 6
Faithfulness to the Boss anti-mechanical, anti-rhetorical thesis, to the
language of the section and the Comment, and to the Tudor dissent requires
evaluation of the transaction in light of traditional subrogation law. In short, the
authority does not command application of the remedy; the authority commands
the inquiry: Is there unjust enrichment?
This inquiry suggests that generally there is no unfairness and that an issuer
will often have a difficult time making a case for the subrogation remedy.
However, an analysis of the common law and of state abstract obligation law
82. Cf U.C.C. § 4-407 (1995) (granting to banks that pay checks improperly, a
remedy of subrogation "to prevent unjust enrichment") (emphasis added).
83. The majority opinion suggests that in its view the independence principle "is
unlikely to be substantially diminished were we to allow subrogation in this situation."
Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. UnitedStates Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 363 (3d Cir.
1992).
84. Id. at 371 (Becker, J., dissenting). In fact, the majority did balance the equities,
affirming the lower court's conclusion that "the equities do not favor subrogation in this
case." Id. at 363.
85. "I would hold that an issuer of a standby letter of credit may, in proper
circumstances, obtain equitable subrogation to the rights of its customer." Id. at 364
(emphasis added).
86. U.C.C. § 5-117 cmt. 1 (1995).
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must abide a brief digression into federal bankruptcy law, which may pretermit
discussion of the issue.
VI. SECTION 509 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
There is obviously something to be gained by fashioning subrogation rules
that effect clarity for the parties as they structure the abstract obligation
transaction." Some commentators suggested prior to the promulgation of
Revised Article 5 that Section 5-117 would resolve the problem by making it
clear that an issuer that pays the applicant's debt is subrogated to the rights of the
beneficiary against the applicant.88 In any event, however, Section 5-117 does
not fashion a bright line test for invoking the subrogation remedy. Rather, it
commands the unjust enrichment inquiry with its attendant concerns for the
equities of the entire transaction. Mechanical application of the remedy is not
true to unjust enrichment jurisprudence. The Bankruptcy Code, however, may
command application of a mechanical rule.
Section 509 of the Bankruptcy Code deals with subrogation of "an entity
that is liable with the debtor on... a claim of [the] creditor against the debtor"
to the rights of a creditor against the debtor. In the bankruptcy setting, some
courts have subrogated abstract obligation issuers to the rights of the beneficiary
against the debtor applicant or its property.89 A majority, however, have refused
87. See Michael Avidon, Subrogation in the Letter of Credit Context, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 129, 137 (1990); Philip Hall, Update on the Application of Subrogation
Principles Involved in Letters of Credit, LETTERS OF CREDIT REPORTS, Sept.-Oct. 1994,
at 4; Klein, supra note 5.
88. Neil Cohen contends, without any unjust enrichment analysis, that subrogation
lies in the abstract obligation context. See Cohen, supra note 12. Professor Cohen, the
reporter for the Restatement of Suretyship, was not unmindful of the unjust enrichment
prerequisite, however, when he drafted the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAw OF SuRETYsHIP AND GuARANTY § 27 cmt. a (1996). He assumes that whenever
the issuer pays the debt of the applicant there is unjust enrichment. The rule he fashions,
then, is akin to a per se rule and one easy to apply. Albert Givray suggests that parties
use assignment to effect post-payment adjustments without subrogation "until the cavalry
arrives in the form of UCC Section R5-117." Albert Givray, Wrongful Honor: Post-
Honor Grab for Beneficiary's Rights without Subrogation, LETrERs OF CREDIT REPORT,
July-Aug. 1995, at 6; see also Klein, supra note 5. Klein reads the proposed Section 5-
117 as granting "an encompassing array of subrogation rights to the issuer," and as
eliminating tb. split of authority on the right of the issuer to be subrogated to the
beneficiary's rights against the applicant. Klein, supra note 5, at 1, 3. Klein also argues
that Section 5-117 eliminates the split of authority on the right of the issuer to be
subrogated to the beneficiary's rights against the applicant. Klein, supra note 5, at 3.
Elsewhere in the same article, however, Klein admits that the adoption of Revised Article
5 will create some uncertainty and demonstrates with clarity the way a court's inquiry
into equitable concerns can render the subrogation remedy opaque.
89. See Sun Co. v. Slamans (In re Slamans), 148 B.R. 623 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
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that relief.9" Some of the bankruptcy cases that deny subrogation do so on the
mechanical analysis that Boss decries and that Section 5-117 prohibits, but those
refusals rest on federal court interpretation of a federal statute and cannot be
revised through state statutory reform.9' Bankruptcy, moreover, is the locus of
many subrogation cases, for it is often the applicant's financial demise that
prompts the issuer to seek subrogation.
In defense of the courts denying subrogation on mechanical analysis, one
must acknowledge that they bottom their decisions on the language of the
Bankruptcy Code itself. Section 509(a) allows subrogation to an entity that is
"liable with the debtor." Because abstract obligation issuers maintain that their
product is independent of the underlying transaction in which the debtor is liable
to the beneficiary, the courts hold that the issuer is not liable with the debtor and
that by negative implication subrogation will not lie.92
One might add that bankruptcy courts arguably should not be burdened with
lengthy inquiry into the equities of the broad transaction out of which the
abstract obligation arises. Pretermitting that broad inquiry might offend
traditional subrogation principles, but fashioning a clear, bright line rule that
renders the inquiry mechanical93 might promote bankruptcy court efficiency. 94
1992), aft'd, CCF, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Slamans), 175 B.R. 762
(N.D. Okla. 1994), rev'd, 69 F.3d 468 (10th Cir. 1995); In re Valley Vue Joint Venture,
123 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991); In re National Serv. Lines, Inc., 80 B.R. 144
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); ef Hall, supra note 87 (suggesting that subrogation is always
available to an issuer under Bankruptcy Code § 509).
90. See In re Slarnans, 69 F.3d at 468; Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Agrownautics, 125 B.R. 350
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); Berliner Handels-Und Frankfuter Bank v. East Tex. Steel
Facilities, Inc. (In re East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117 B.R. 235 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1990); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel
Corp.), 89 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re Munzenrieder Corp., 58 B.R. 228
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Economic Enters., Inc. (In re
Economic Enters., Inc.), 44 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
91. See, e.g., In re Slamans, 69 F.3d at 468. Professor White valiantly and
ingeniously argues to the contrary that state law informs the language of Section 509.
See White, supra note 23, at 51-55.
92. See, e.g., In re Slamans, 69 F.3d at 476; In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 89 B.R. at
154; cf In re East Tex. Steel, 117 B.R. at 241 (no subrogation when issuer and applicant
not jointly liable); In re Agrownautics, Inc., 125 B.R. at 353 (no subrogation when
parties not codebtors).
93. It would be unfair to suggest that mechanical application of the section appears
only in those cases that deny subrogation. In fact, courts that allow subrogation are
guilty of mechanical analysis as well. See, e.g., In re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R.
199 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991). In Valley Vue, the court rejected the majority view and
criticized it for ignoring the fact that an abstract obligation works in many ways as
secondary guaranties work. Id. at 212. But, the court then granted subrogation without
any unjust enrichment analysis. Id. Valley Vue substitutes one brand of mechanical
analysis for another, and does so in a situation that suggests there was in fact no unjust
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If bankruptcy considerations are paramount, Revised Article 5 cannot displace
them; and it may be that Section 5-117 only will bear on non-bankruptcy cases.95
In some bankruptcy situations, a guarantor or issuer would be entitled to
subrogation to the beneficiary's collateral as a matter of common law. Yet, a
beneficiary can defeat the issuer's right by refusing to file a claim in the
bankruptcy and then making a claim on the guarantee/abstract obligation. In
such event, a guarantor/issuer of that obligation is seriously harmed. The
principal/applicant is insolvent, and the guarantor/issuer has no claim against the
principal's assets. One authority suggests that the purpose of Section 509 is to
protect the issuer/guarantor from that possibility.96 If that suggestion is correct,
it is probably best to read Section 509 as non-exclusive, that is, as an instance of
the Bankruptcy Code's protecting the issuer's common law remedy against
strategic behavior by the beneficiary and not as a command that bankruptcy
courts invoke mechanical subrogation analysis.97
Interpreting Section 509 as non-exclusive does not undermine the position
of this Article that the common law of subrogation with its unjust enrichment
prerequisite governs subrogation in bankruptcy as well as elsewhere. The
bankruptcy cases that engage in unjust enrichment analysis also support this
reading of Section 509.9' Until there is controlling authority to the contrary,
enrichment.
94. At least two commentators have argued in favor of a bright line rule. See
Avidon, supra note 87; Hall, supra note 87. Others have suggested that Revised Article
5 has itself fashioned a bright line rule. See Barkley Clark, Can the Issuer of a Standby
Letter of Credit Jump into the Shoes of a Secured Beneficiary?, LETTER OF CREDIT
UPDATE, Apr. 1997, at 19; Neil Cohen, Credit Enhancement in Domestic Transactions:
Conceptualizing the Devices and Reinventing the Law, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 21, 47
(1996) (hereinafter Credit Enhancement); Klein, supra note 5, at 1.
95. For non-bankruptcy cases denying subrogation, see Insurance Corp. v. Latino
Americana de Reaseguros, S.A., 868 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Bell, 601 So. 2d 939 (Ala. 1992); Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper Co., 907
P.2d 1179 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
96. 4 LAWRENCE KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 509.01 (15th rev. ed. 1998).
97. On the non-exclusivity question, the cases are split. See, e.g., In re Missionary
Baptist Found. of Am., Inc., 667 F.2d 1244, 1246 (5th Cir. 1982) (not exclusive);
Creditors' Comm. v. Commonwealth, 105 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989)
(Section 509, not state law, is source of subrogation rights); In re Spirtos, 103 B.R. 240,
245 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (not exclusive); Cooper v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 83 B.R.
544, 546 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988) (Section 509 as source of codebtor's subrogation
without regard for state common law); In re Munzenrieder, 58 B.R. 228 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1986) (invoking equitable subrogation without mentioning Section 509).
98. There remains one other danger for the issuer of an abstract obligation (or
guarantor under a secondary guaranty) that claims subrogation to the beneficiary's rights
against the applicant. If the issuer makes a subrogation claim, it may not make a claim
against the principal in the bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)9(C)
(1994); Eber, The Role of Reimbursement Agreements, LETrERS OF CREDIT REPORT,
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courts determined to grant subrogation relief in bankruptcy might hold that
Section 509 is not exclusive and that there are other ways at common law for a
codebtor to fashion the subrogation remedy.
It may also be important to note that close reading of the bankruptcy cases
indicates that although courts sometimes couch their rulings in the "liable with"
language of Section 509, often the facts of the cases do not support a subrogation
remedy. Rather the facts suggest that the party seeking subrogation has not been
able to show unjust enrichment or has otherwise failed to satisfy traditional
requisites for subrogation.99
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 1; cf Jenkins v. National Sur. Co., 277 U.S. 258 (1928) (denying
direct claim by surety against bankrupt principal when subrogation law denied surety its
subrogation claim).
99. Traditionally, bankruptcy courts have imposed five requirements that a party
must satisfy in order to have subrogation. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v.
Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 89 B.R. 150, 152 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
They are: (1) that the party seeking subrogation have acted to protect its own interests;
(2) that it not have paid as a volunteer, (3) that the party must not have been primarily
liable; (4) that the debt is fully paid; and (5) that subrogation not work an injustice
against third parties. See White, supra note 23, at 55. Many of the letter of credit cases
refer to the third element and thereby offend the Boss thesis and offend Section 5-117.
But there is bankruptcy authority that relies on other elements and that arguably has
engaged in unjust enrichment analysis. See In re Wilcox, 196 B.R. 212, 213 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1996) (denying applicant subrogation to issuer's rights in mortgage after issuer had
released mortgage); In re Agrownautics, Inc., 125 B.R. 350, 353 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991)
(same); Berliner Handels-Und Frankfuter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re
East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117 B.R. 235, 241 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 1990) (denying
subrogation under both the third and the fifth elements); Merchant's Bank & Trust Co.
v. Economic Enters, Inc. (In re Economic Enters., Inc.), 44 B.R. 230, 232 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1984) (finding that issuer had other sources for reimbursement and forcing issuer
to pursue them); cf Insurance Corp. v. Latino Americana de Reaseguros, S.A., 868 F.
Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (similar non-bankruptcy case). Some cases that grant
subrogation are devoid of any analysis, holding simply that abstract obligations are
similar to suretyship undertaking and, therefore, that subrogation should lie. See In re
National Serv. Lines Inc., 80 B.R. 144 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); In re Sensor Sys., Inc.,
79 B.R. 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). The opinion inIn re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123
B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991), is surely the most egregious example of an opinion that
fails to analyze the transaction for unjust enrichment. See supra note 93. For a
thoughtful opinion that rehearses the controversy with considerable attention to Judge
Becker's dissent in Tudor and yet which denies subrogation to an issuer, see Mead Corp.,
907 P.2d at 1179. In a Canadian insolvency case that admittedly uses language from the
original version of Article 5 that Revised Article 5 renders invalid, the court denied
subrogation to an issuer whose duty it was, in the court's view, to evaluate the
creditworthiness of parties with whom it contracts. See Westpac Banking Corp. v. Duke
Group Ltd., [1994] O.R.3d 515; see also Wilkins v. Commercial Inv. Trust Corp., 153
F.3d 1273 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (denying subrogation to applicant after analysis ofunderlying
transaction); Tokyo Kogyo Boeki Shokai v. United States Nat'l Bank, 126 F.3d 1135
(9th Cir. 1997) (denying subrogation with similar thoughtful analysis concluding that
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VII. PREVENTING CouRT REALLOCATION
OF PRIVATELY ORDERED BURDENS
It is a general feature of subrogation, one applicable but not confined to the
abstract obligation context, that subrogation reallocates burdens that
sophisticated commercial parties have allocated for themselves in their
underlying contract bargaining. Similarly, subrogation can reallocate insolvency
costs that an efficient regime would allocate to the party that made a credit
misjudgment. Promiscuous granting of the subrogation remedy will inevitably
prompt commercial parties to eschew the abstract obligation for other risk
shifting arrangements.'00 At this point, it may be necessary to make two
assumptions: (1) that courts should not reallocate burdens that sophisticated
commercial parties have allocated in their underlying relationship, and (2) that
it is efficient and just to let a party that mistakenly grants credit to an incipient
insolvent bear the cost of the credit mistake.
Subrogation has a purpose: to effect fairness when there is unfairness by
obviating unjust enrichment. In some contexts one cannot deny the efficacy of
subrogation. Classic subrogation cases are obvious instances of unjust
enrichment that would go uncorrected but for the equitable remedy. Subrogation
can prevent the insured under an automobile accident insurance policy from a
double recovery,"' can prohibit a debtor from enjoying security freed from a lien
by a guarantor's payment of the debtor's obligation, 2 and can subordinate a
second mortgagee to the rights of a payor that satisfied the first mortgage and
thereby promoted the second mortgage. 3
Historically, subrogation arose in the suretyship setting, since sureties
predate other kinds of guaranties and insumnce. ' One historical function of the
applicant had behaved imprudently and, therefore, was not entitled to equitable relief);
cf Prairie State Nat'l Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896) (denying subrogation
to lender that made voluntary advance); In re I.C. Herman & Co., 497 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir.) (denying subrogation to customs broker that voluntarily paid customs duties), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
100. See supra note 66 (suggesting alternatives).
101. See, e.g., Martin v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 235 (11th Cir.
1991); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 104 A.2d 288 (N.J. 1954).
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 28(l)(C) & cmt.
e (1996).
103. In First Fed. Say. Bank v. United States, 118 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 1997),
however, the court denied such subrogation when it was apparent that the party that
would ultimately benefit from the subrogation, a title insurer, had been negligent. Id. at
534.
104. See RONALD HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 227
(1964); Barlow Burke, Reclaiming the Law of Suretyship, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 449, 452
(1997); William H. Woods, Historical Development of Suretyship, in THE LAW OF
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remedy was to encourage sureties to undertake suretyship obligations by
granting them a sufficient remedy. 5 Although early authority suggests that
subrogation rested on the presumed intent of the parties, '0 courts eventually
came to view it primarily as a means to prevent unjust enrichment. 7 As
corporations came into the suretyship enterprise and various types of insurance
became prominent features of commerce,"~ courts and commentators struggled
to tether the remedy. Sureties and casualty insurers usually were entitled to
subrogation,' ° but life and other "valued policy" issuers were not."' Courts
have gone to some lengths to distinguish indemnity coverage, which is
subrogation remediable, and classic insurance coverage, which is not."'
Traditionally, courts went to considerable effort to tie subrogation either to
the unjust enrichment standard or to public policy standards. Subrogation was
unavailable to a bail bondsman in an early case on the grounds that allowing
subrogation would decrease the bondsman's incentive to get the defendant to the
courthouse."' Some more recent opinions have found, for public policy reasons,
that subrogation may not be available even when a lender pays a secured debt
and thereby creates a windfall for creditors of the bankrupt debtor"' or when a
SURETYsHiP 2-1, 2-18 to 2-19 (Edward G. Gallagher ed., 1993); William Lloyd,
Comment, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 40, 59-61 (1916); see also REMEDIES, supra
note 7, at 405-06 (characterizing sureties on promissory notes as classic beneficiaries of
subrogation remedy).
105. See Lloyd, supra note 104, at 40.
106. See, e.g., Hampton v. Phipps, 108 U.S. 260, 264 (1883); EDWARD SPENCER,
THE GENERAL LAW OF SURETYSHIP 178 (1913); John Dawson, Restitution or Damages?,
20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 184 (1959).
107. See supra note 8 (citing authorities). Economists might argue that presumed
intent, based on assumptions concerning the parties' relative ability to manage risk,
remains a sufficient justification.
108. For accounts of that transition, see Lloyd, supra note 104, at 40; Willis
Morgan, The History and Economics of Suretyship, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 153 (1926) (Pt. I),
12 CORNELL L.Q.. 487 (1926) (Pt. II).
109. See, e.g., Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 116 N.W. 633
(Wis. 1908). See generally GOFF & JONES, supra note 8, at 538; 1 PALMER, supra note
4, at 23.
110. Spencer Kimball & Don Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
MICH. L. REv. 841, 845, 850 (1962).
111. See, e.g., American Inter-Fidelity Exch. v. American Re-Ins. Co., 17 F.3d
1018 (7th Cir. 1994); Command Transp., Inc. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 62 F.3d 18
(lst Cir. 1995); Ford Motor Co. v. Transportation Indem. Co., 41 B.R. 433 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 795 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1986).
112. United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729 (1884).
113. See Mottaz v. Kiedel (In re Keidel), 613 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1980), where the
payment satisfied a secured debt, but the payor failed to obtain a proper security interest.
The result, the court held, was justified in order to promote "the strong policy favoring
diligence" in perfecting security interests. Id. at 175. A windfall to the debtor's estate
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lender makes an advance in circumstances that created risks for others." 4
Similarly, subrogation to a mortgagor's rights on a mortgage note may be
unavailable to an insurer of the mortgaged premises if the mortgagor pays for the
insurance but not if the mortgagee pays for it."'
One of the disconcerting features of the whole debate on the rights of the
abstract obligation issuer is the dearth of unjust enrichment and public policy
analysis by those who favor subrogation. The premise seems to be that because
the function of the abstract obligation is similar to the function of the suretyship
undertaking and because the surety enjoys subrogation, the abstract obligation
issuer should have it, too. .16 It may be that subrogation in general has become
untethered, as at least two critics suggest.
1 7
was justified here, the court held, because of a public policy in favor of requiring
creditors to be diligent in having their liens noted on the title to a mobile home. Id. Cf
First Fed. Say. Bank v. United States, 118 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 1997) (no subrogation when
remedy would benefit negligent party); In re Wilcox, 196 B.R. 212 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996)
(no subrogation for elderly woman who paid mortgage debt without benefit of counsel
and failed to ensure that mortgage was not released). But cf Rinn v. First Union Nat'l.
Bank, 176 B.R. 401 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (excusing creditor's failure to obtain new
security interest when it paid secured debt); Ninth Dist. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Ed Duggan,
Inc., 821 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1991) (allowing unjust enrichment claim against secured
creditor of feed supplier whose feed fattened lender's collateral, all with lender's
knowledge). For criticism of this last case, see Craig Tighe, The Unjust Enrichment
Doctrine: An Expanded Definition Threatens the Rights of Secured Lenders, 25 U.C.C.
L.J. 203 (1993).
114. See Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export Co.,
303 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 942 (1962).
115. See authority cited in 4 PALMER, supra note 8, at 367-69; Morton Campbell,
Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 YALE L.J. 69, 99 (1935).
116. Those who argue that the abstract obligation issuer should enjoy the
subrogation remedy, include Alces, supra note 12; James Barnes & James Byrne, UCC
Survey: Letters of Credit, 48 Bus. LAw. 1635, 1642 (1993); Boss, supra note 12, at
1128-31; Clark, supra note 94, at 19; Cohen, supra note 12, at 5; Cohen, supra note 94,
at 47; Hall, supra note 87, at 4; Jarvis, supra note 5; Klein, supra note 5, at 1; Gerald
McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit and Guaranties: An Exercise in Cartography,
34 WM. &MARYL. REv. 1139, 1154-55 (1993); White, supra note 23. Not all of the
writers agree, however. See Albert Givray, supra note 88, at 6; Mary Pappas, Comment,
Reconciling Standby Letters of Credit and the Principle of Subrogation in Section 509,
7 BANKR. DEv. J. 227 (1990). One commentator, writing before the revision of Article
5, pleaded for certainty, yet acknowledged that whether subrogation is allowed should
be a question decided by the equities of each case. See Avidon, supra note 87, at 129.
117. See Steven Walt & Emily Sherwin, Contribution Arguments in Commercial
Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 897, 908-37 (1993). Stephenson v. Salisbury (In re Corland Corp.),
967 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1992) may illustrate the problem. In that case, Stephenson
guaranteed the debt of Corland to a bank. Id. at 1072. Corland, of course, issued its
promissory note to the bank to evidence the debt. Stephenson, in turn, executed a
guaranty. By virtue of the relationship, Corland owed money to the bank and owed a
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When the surety satisfies the debt of the principal obligor, equity generally
grants subrogation to the surety."8 To effect that result when the surety pays the
debt of its principal is not inconsistent with a rule that denies that result when the
abstract obligation issuer satisfies the debt of its principal, the "applicant" who
applies for the credit.
There are two reasons for this disparate treatment. One might argue that the
first is a matter of public policy, the second a matter of unjust enrichment
analysis. First, as subpart IV(A) explains, subrogation corrodes the
independence of the obligation by its effect on the obligor's behavior. The issuer
of an abstract obligation or of a secondary guaranty who knows he will have
subrogation behaves differently from the issuer who knows he will not. In the
guaranty setting, that difference is benign; in the abstract obligation transaction,
it is pernicious. The second reason lies in the difference between classic
suretyship and classic banking and rests on the notion that it is not unjust to let
a lender that makes a bad loan pay the costs of its misjudgment. The classic
surety assumes risks; the classic banker is risk averse. Efficient commercial
rules let the market pay the risk taker according to the law of risk. Efficient
commercial rules do not reward the banker that takes an unwarranted risk by
making a bad loan.
Subrogation in the abstract obligation context, even if in theory it is only
available post-payment, will impact the independence of the credit and damage
the bank product. Thus, a legal distinction, the primary/secondary distinction,
demands different application of the subrogation remedy to abstract obligations
on the one hand and secondary guaranties on the other, not simply because the
issuer is paying its own debt (the line of analysis rejected by Boss and Revised
Article 5) but because the subrogation remedy corrodes an important feature of
abstract obligations. This is not a rhetorical distinction forbidden by Revised
Article 5; it is a distinction based on the policy of protecting the abstract
obligation as a viable commercial device.
reimbursement obligation to Stephenson. Corland's balance sheet should have reflected
that reality. The opinion recites, however, that Corland, as part of the transaction, took
a promissory note from Stephenson. The court was curious about the reason for this
second note, as well it might have been; but the court did not dwell on the point. It
should have. Possibly, the second note was a device to disguise the fact in Corland's
financial statements that it had incurred a liability with no offsetting asset. By taking
Stephenson's note, Corland's financial statements would show a liability with a
corresponding asset, plus, of course, the proceeds of the loan, which undoubtedly
vanished with celerity. This explanation is all conjecture, of course, but if it is an
accurate characterization of the true facts, which are unknown, Stephenson was party to
a fraud and was decidedly not entitled to subrogation or any other equitable remedy.
Because the Corland court was less interested in the underlying facts than true unjust
enrichment inquiry would require, we do not know whether there was fraud or whether
Stephenson was truly entitled to subrogation.
118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27 (1996);
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 141 (1941).
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Other differences between the guaranty and abstract payment obligation
products that support different application of the remedy concern matters of
equity, that is, matters of subrogation law itself. For purposes of policy analysis,
these differences are also compelling. It would be a non-sequitur to say that the
abstract obligation transaction is subject to subrogation, if as a matter of
subrogation law, equity would deny subrogation to the abstract obligation
parties. In truth, subrogation law often would deny subrogation because, in the
abstract obligation transaction, the essential ingredient of subrogation,
unfairness, is usually missing.
While the position advanced here-that issuers and others are generally not
entitled to subrogation-usually will disfavor banks, who are abstract obligation
issuers, the fact that the law does not consider issuers sureties may favor banks
in some instances. California law, for instance, protects letter of credit issuers
from state mortgage anti-deficiency legislation"9 but denies that protection to
sureties. 2 ' Arguably, that example is consistent with the policy advanced here
of differentiating the two commercial products.
A. Suretyship vs. Lending
When a fidelity company issues a bond to a bank to protect it against the
dishonest acts of its depositors and pays the bank for losses the bank sustains by
virtue of a depositor's dishonest scheme, the law wisely subrogates the fidelity
company to the bank's rights against the depositor. In this instance, subrogation
effects fairness, for absent subrogation, either the bank would have two
recoveries (one from the fidelity company and one from the depositor), or the
fidelity company's payment would free the dishonest depositor from liability,
having satisfied the depositor's obligation to the bank.' This example
illustrates the circumstances in which equity strives to prevent unjust results and
uses the subrogation remedy to correct a situation that would otherwise shock the
conscience.
This application of subrogation, moreover, is consistent with the bonding
industry's practice of pricing its fidelity bonds through actuarial computation.
The price of fidelity bonds reflects the history of past industry losses and
predictions of future industry losses. As losses increase, premiums mount; as
losses decrease, premiums diminish. True, in recent years fidelity companies
have become more concerned with an insured's financial strength,' and some
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 580.5 (West Supp. 1998).
120. Western Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court, 933 P.2d 507, 516-17 (Cal.
1997).
121. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 285 U.S.
209, 214 (1932).
122. It is a curious coincidence that fidelity companies that issue some bonds take
an abstract obligation issued by the principal's bank as security for their principal's
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banks have become more concerned with statistical loan evaluation 23 as
products from the two industries have begun to overlap. Subrogation's
application in the fidelity industry context, however, evolved during the period
when fidelity companies engaged in classic suretyship conduct. 24 If fidelity
companies grow more and more to resemble banks, the law of subrogation may
become less and less suitable to them. It is not the purpose of this Article,
however, to examine that issue because the issue here is whether subrogation is
suitable to a traditional bank product, the abstract obligation.
To the extent that subrogation succeeds in the classic fidelity context in
avoiding unjust enrichment of dishonest employees, for example, it also
succeeds in reducing the fidelity industry's losses. It has the beneficial effect of
reducing the cost of fidelity coverage, a product whose price traditionally is a
function of loss. It also internalizes costs, putting the embezzlement loss on the
dishonest employee rather than spreading those losses to employers of honest
employees."z Generally, insurers are efficient risk bearers because they pool
these risks efficiently.
In these settings, the fidelity industry's recovery via subrogation is largely
fortuitous. The fidelity company does not know at the time it writes the fidelity
bond whether future dishonest employees will have assets that it can exploit.
Yet, losses in the fidelity industry are also fortuitous. Fortuity is inherent in
classic fidelity practices and, to some extent, in fidelity bond law. Note,
moreover, that in the fidelity bond transaction, the fidelity company is in no
position to take collateral or other security from employees, many of whom are
not employed at the time the fidelity company writes the blanket bond.
Abstract obligations, unlike actuarially priced fidelity products, are
primarily commercial bank products. Bankers issue abstract obligations not on
the basis of an actuary's loss prediction but on a loan officer's credit judgment
obligation to reimburse. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595
F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1979).
123. The practice in banking is called "scoring." See generally Ronald Mann, The
Role ofSecured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEo. L.J. 1, 30-34 (1997) (scoring
in small business lending); David F. Snow, The Dischargeability of Credit Card Debt:
New Developments and the Need for a New Direction, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 86-87
(1998) (explaining use of scoring in credit card industry and its impact on
dischargeability of credit card debt); Arthur E. Wiimarth, Jr., Too Good to Be True? The
Unfulfilled Promises Behind Big BankMergers, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 36-41 (1995)
(implicit criticism of scoring in small business loan markets). For a report indicating that
scoring may have limited use in commercial lending, see John Racine, Community Banks
Reject Credit Scoringfor the Human Touch, AM. BANKER, May 22, 1995, at 12.
124. For discussion of the evolution of fidelity insurance, see Morgan, supra note
108.
125. It is not clear whether the employee or the employer bears the cost of fidelity
insurance. One of them must. Perhaps it is the employer, perhaps the employee, perhaps
they should share the cost. In any of these cases, it is fairer and more efficient to allocate
the cost of employee infidelity to the unfaithful employee.
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that the borrower will repay the bank's advance when and if the bank honors the
beneficiary's payment request under the abstract obligation.'2 6 Bank abstract
obligation application agreements usually require the bank customer to grant a
security interest to the credit issuer to secure advances made under the abstract
obligation, and the application agreements generally reserve to the bank the right
to refuse to issue future obligations if the bank becomes dissatisfied with the
applicant's credit. 27 In short, the banking industry engages in the traditional
banking activity of evaluating credit risk in marketing its abstract obligation
product whereas the fidelity company generally engages in actuarial evaluation
in issuing many of its products.'28
These distinctions between classic fidelity industry products and classic
banking industry products are not rhetorical; they are matters of commercial
function, and the impact of these differences on subrogation analysis is
compelling. Just as it makes good sense generally to invoke subrogation in the
traditional fidelity industry setting, so it makes good sense generally not to
invoke it in the traditional bank abstract obligation setting. The following
discussion uses two abstract obligation transactions to illustrate the point.'29
126. "The bank should either be fully collateralized or have a post-honor right of
reimbursement from its customer or form another issuer of an independent undertaking."
Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Ruling, 12 C.F.R. § 7.1016(b)(1)(iv) (1998);
see also McGuiNNEss, supra note 13, 12.106 (explaining the differences between
surety evaluation of a transaction and banker evaluation of it).
127. For an illustration of such an application agreement, see DOLAN, LETTERS OF
CREDIT, supra note 49, app. E, doe. 13.
128. There are some who contend that banks issue letters of credit rather than
guaranties because banking law traditionally forbids banks to issue "guaranties." See,
e.g., Richard Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy,
96 BANKING L.L 46 (1979). In fact, the issue is not one of restricting banks from issuing
guaranties; it is one of restricting their issuance of secondary obligations. As the
Comptroller's interpretive ruling makes clear, as long as banks issue undertakings that
are payable against documents rather than against the happening or non-happening of
events, banking soundness and safety considerations are satisfied. Comptroller of the
Currency, Interpretive Ruling, 12 C.F.R. § 7.1016(a) (1998); see also Republic Nat'l
Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978) (rehearsing the controversy
and explaining the distinction).
129. The discussion in the text would limit subrogation to cases in which the
remedy does not harm the independence of the credit. For the view that subrogation
should never lie in what is essentially a loan transaction, see Paul v. Speirway Ltd., 2 All
E.R. 587, 598 (Ch. 1976) ("As it seems to me, where a court, on a review of the facts,
comes to the conclusion that what was intended between the parties was really an
unsecured borrowing, there is no room for the doctrine of subrogation.").
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B. The Privately Bargained Abstract Obligation Transaction
In a simple and quite common transaction, a developer of real estate uses
an abstract obligation (usually a standby letter of credit) as the developer's
equity in a real estate development transaction. 30 First, the developer seeks a
mortgage loan and grants the lender a mortgage in the real estate. Often, the
mortgage is non-recourse.13 1 The lender does not disburse the loan proceeds,
however, until the developer provides its equity, say, ten percent of the
development cost. The parties agree that the developer may contribute its ten
percent by having its bank issue a standby letter of credit in favor of the
mortgage lender. The credit provides that, upon the mortgage lender's
certification that the developer has defaulted on a term of the mortgage note, the
credit issuer will pay the lender the ten percent. The bank issuing the standby
must make a credit judgment concerning the developer's ability to reimburse the
bank in the event the lender calls on it to pay under the credit. The credit issuer
may seek security from the developer, such as a security interest in stock or
certificates of deposit, personal guarantees of financially strong individuals or
corporations, or a mortgage on other real estate.'32
In the event of default on the mortgage and the mortgage lender's draw on
the abstract obligation, the bank will pay the lender and will seek reimbursement
from the developer. Sometimes the bank may find that it erred in its credit
judgment, that the developer is unable to satisfy its reimbursement obligation to
the bank, and that the security taken by the bank is inadequate to make the bank
whole. In this event, 33 the bank may seek to subrogate itself to the lender's
mortgage interest to the extent of the ten percent the bank paid the lender.
31
130. See, e.g., West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Pa.
1976); Getman v. Green (In re Admiral's Walk, Inc.), 134 B.R. 105, 113 (Bankr. W.D.
N.Y. 1991); East Bank, N.A. v. Dovenmuehle, Inc., 589 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1978).
131. In a non-recourse mortgage, the mortgagee may look only to the mortgaged
premises to recoup its losses and may not make a deficiency claim against the mortgagor.
For discussion of nonrecourse security interests such as nonrecourse mortgages in
bankruptcy, see David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, 26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 549 (1999).
132. It is common for the mortgage lender to insist that the mortgaged real estate
be free from all liens, except its own, so that the developer may not grant the bank a
mortgage interest in that real estate. These facts are a simplified version of the apparent
financing arrangements inIn re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199, 201-02 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1991).
133. It may be, of course, that the bank has made no error and that it is adequately
collateralized for this loss. The bank, however, may have made other loans to the
developer and may want to preserve its collateral for defaults under those loans rather
than exhaust it on the developer's default on the reimbursement obligation.
134. Significantly, if the bank cannot recover from the applicant, the mortgagor,
it may seek reimbursement from guarantors of the reimbursement obligation. Payment
by those guarantors would give them a subrogation remedy under traditional subrogation
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In a jurisdiction following the mechanical subrogation analysis rejected by
Boss and Revised Article 5, it is clear that the credit issuer would be denied
subrogation. When the credit issuer paid the lender, the issuer satisfied its own
debt to the lender. Subrogation is not, as a matter of rhetoric at least, available
to a party that satisfies its own debt.135 As Boss shows, however, that rhetorical
argument misses the critical point that the bank's payment to the lender satisfied
at least part of the developer's debt. To that extent, Boss would subrogate the
bank to the mortgage interest in the developed real estate.
136
Subrogation in this context, however, upsets the risk structure and
substitutes a different allocation of costs and risk from the one the parties
themselves fashioned when they entered into the transaction. Subrogation
rewards the bank issuer, moreover, in the face of its credit misjudgment and
penalizes other parties (presumably the creditors of the developer, if the
developer is insolvent) who will now have fewer assets out of which to satisfy
their claims.137  Denying subrogation here has the beneficial effect' of
internalizing the cost of the bank's misjudgment by leaving that cost on the bank.
A second illustration of the general unsuitability of subrogation in the
abstract obligation setting involves a confirming bank.38 In the mortgage
transaction described above, it may be that the mortgage lender is not satisfied
with the credit of the bank issuer and, therefore, insists that there be a financially
strong bank to confirm the issuer's credit. 139 To grant the confinmer subrogation
rights after it pays the mortgage lender yields similar reallocation of bargained-
for risk allocation. When the confirmer pays the mortgage lender, the confirmer
seeks reimbursement from the credit issuer. If the credit issuer fails, the
rules. Such a result is implicit in the holding of the court in In re Valley Vue Joint
Venture, 123 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991), where the applicant reimbursed the
confirmer and successfully subrogated itself to the confinmer's rights. Whether
subrogation should obtain in that setting is a matter that is beyond the scope of this
Article, though this analysis suggests that subrogation in that setting is inefficient and not
supported by unjust enrichment analysis.
135. See 11 U.S.C. § 509((b)(2) (1994); accord Patterson v. Yeargin (In re
Yeargin), 116 B.R 621 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1990); Fisher v. Outlet Co. (In re Denby
Stores, Inc.), 86 B.R. 768, 775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); DuBose v. Kazmarski (In re
DuBose), 22 B.R. 780 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
136. See Boss, supra note 12, at 1111 (supporting the analysis in In re Valley Vue).
137. Significantly, traditional subrogation law does not subrogate the credit issuer
to the rights of the mortgage lender in this illustration unless the credit fully satisfies the
lender's debt. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27 (1996).
138. These facts are a simplified version of In re Glade Springs, Inc., 826 F.2d 440
(6th Cir. 1987).
139. A confirmer undertakes to honor the issuer's obligation much as if the
confirmer were the issuer. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(4) (1995); UCP 500, supra note 26,
art. 9(b). For obvious reasons, a beneficiary is often well advised to insist that it have the
benefit of a confirmation by a strong financial institution in its own market.
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confirmer seeks subrogation against the collateral the issuer took from the
developer/applicant.
Although a confirmer may at the outset take an interest in the collateral the
issuer holds, by failing to do so in this illustration when it decided to confirm, the
confirmer relied only on the credit strength of the issuer. Its decision to confirm
is as much an extension of credit to the issuer as the issuer's act of issuance is an
extension of credit to the developer. Bank regulators treat confirmations of
standby credits as they treat standby credits. They require the confirmer to count
the confirmed credit amount as an interbank extension of credit. 4 Confirmers
obviously may secure their reimbursement rights in those cases where the
issuer's credit is questionable or where reimbursement may be difficult. If the
confirmer is not satisfied with the issuer's credit, the confirmer may refuse to
confirm or may seek an assignment from the issuer of its rights in the
developer's assets or it may seek collateral directly from the developer. The
issuer and the developer may resist those efforts, however; and the confirmer
may lose the confirmation business or may have to pay for the additional security
by reducing its charges. The conformer often does not know the developer, does
not seek an interest in the developer's property, and relies solely on the credit of
the issuer.
Sometimes the conformer errs in that reliance. If it does, it finds it must
make a claim in the issuer's receivership and that under the ex ante allocation of
risks, it has no rights in the developer's property when it seeks reimbursement
from the issuer. To grant subrogation to the confirmer is to reallocate the
positions under which the parties bargained to operate and to create an
adventitious remedy.
There are two reasons for not upsetting thebargained-for allocation in these
illustrative transactions: (1) cost internalization (letting commercial parties pay
for their own misjudgments); and (2) consistency with rational insolvency
schemes.
First, by hypothesis, commercial loss is always wasteful. To the extent the
law internalizes that loss, there are incentives to keep loss to a minimum. To the
extent the law externalizes loss, that incentive diminishes. The two illustrations
above demonstrate that excluding subrogation in these abstract obligation
transactions internalizes costs whereas granting subrogation externalizes them.
Banks should not issue abstract obligations for applicants that cannot reimburse
the bank. To do so is to invite commercial loss. In the event of such loss, if the
law leaves it on the party that invited it, that party and others similarly situated
will be reluctant to issue abstract obligations for applicants that are not
creditworthy. Thus, by leaving the loss on the erring issuer, the law discourages
conduct that leads to waste. By the same token, banks should not confirm
abstract obligations for financially weak issuers. Again, such conduct invites
140. See Federal Res. Bd., Reg. F, 12 C.F.R. pt. 206 (1998).
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loss, and the law's allocation of that loss to the confirmer internalizes the cost
and disciplines the confirmer for misjudgment.
Second, perhaps in part as an acknowledgment of the value in internalizing
costs, federal insolvency regimes generally reward diligent creditors that obtain
security and leave paltry dividends to the less diligent creditors that are
unsecured. Under the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured issuers must await whatever
dividends are available after the trustee in bankruptcy satisfies secured claims
out of the estate's insufficient assets. Similarly, bank insolvency law generally
protects secured creditors. 4'
It is difficult to characterize as unjust the view that the confirmer should
proceed to file a claim in the issuer's insolvency proceedings. In fact, it is quite
fair that it, as an unsecured creditor of the issuer, should be satisfied with the
same dividend that other unsecured creditors receive. The issuer's receiver will,
in turn, make a claim against the developer or its estate for the payment the
confirmer made to the mortgage lender. The developer or its estate must satisfy
that claim, just as the issuer or its estate must satisfy the claim of the
confirmer."4'
All of this will strike some as circuitous, but it is not a useless circuit, for
it forces commercial parties to make their claims through the filters of insolvency
law. Subrogating the confinner to the issuer's rights in the developer's collateral
gives the confirner the cake of the collateral instead of the crumbs insolvency
law affords. Refusing to grint secured status to the confirmer expost when that
confirmer did not take security ex ante is hardly a case of injustice. On the
contrary, one might view it as a supremely just result.
In both of the illustrative transactions, the absence of subrogation leaves the
insolvency regimes intact. The credit issuer that does not take security is an
unsecured creditor in the applicant's bankruptcy. The confirmer that fails to take
security is an unsecured creditor in the liquidation of the failed issuer.
Subrogation in these cases would alter the results by treating the unsecured
issuer in Tudor as a secured creditor and by giving the confirmer in the second
illustration (the Glade Springs facts) rights against a third party the confirmer did
not bargain for. These illustrations are typical.143 The reason for the subrogation
141. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(e)(11) (1994).
142. It is not clear from the opinion in the Glade Springs case that the issuer's
receiver ever made a claim against the applicant; that failure with its attendant windfall
for the applicant, which was itself insolvent, may have prompted the court's unfortunate
decision.
143. For an opinion describing a third abstract obligation setting in which the court
denied subrogation, see Tokyo Kogyo Shokai v. US. Nat'l Bank, 126 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.
1997) (denying subrogation of applicant to issuer's rights against bank nominated to
make advances under red clause credit). The Tokyo Kogyo Shokai opinion is spiced with
irreverent humor and at least one barb for the applicant seeking subrogation: "A 'red
clause' is so called because it is often printed in red so as to call attention to it. It may
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remedy, unjust enrichment, is often absent in the abstract obligation transaction.
Principles of equity, then, usually do not support subrogation in the abstract
obligation context44 In short, as a matter of classic subrogation analysis,
abstract obligation issuers usually should not benefit from subrogation.
One might raise objections to this analysis by pointing to Revised Article
5 as positive law enshrining subrogation in the abstract obligation transaction.
There are two obvious objections: (1) that the issuer's payment of its own assets
to the beneficiary has benefitted the unsecured creditors of the developer's
estate, thereby enriching them, perhaps unjustly, and (2) that the analysis offered
here applies to so many transactions, most of them outside the abstract obligation
context, that subrogation will have little room to operate.
4 5
also be the color of the face of whomever at [the applicant] agreed to this provision." Id.
at 1135 n.2. The result is consistent with the thesis of this Article that there is nothing
unjust in letting parties, bankers or others, pay for their mistakes. In another case, the
court denied subrogation to a letter of credit applicant whose letter of credit proceeds
satisfied maritime liens on a vessel to which the lienors had made repairs. In Wilkins v.
Commercial Inv. Trust Corp., 153 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1998), the court refused to grant
the subrogation remedy. Rather than grant or deny the remedy mechanically, the Wilkins
court reasoned that since the purpose of the transaction was to protect the
defendant/owner of the vessel from liens, there was no unjust enrichment in denying the
subrogation. Instead, the court concluded, it would be unjust to grant the remedy and
thereby defeat the purpose of the transaction. Because they engage in unjust enrichment
analysis, Tokyo Kogyo Shokai and Wilkins should survive enactment of Section 5-117.
See also Stewart v. Tasnet, Inc., 718 So. 2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (denying
subrogation to applicants who received stock and failed to take any subrogation rights
when they agreed to reimburse confirmer of standby credit).
144. Subrogation might lie in some cases, those where there is true unjust
enrichment and where subrogation would not alter the parties' allocations of risks and
costs. In such a case, subrogation would be proper. It is that case, one must assume as
a matter of principled statutory construction, that the drafters of the original version of
Article 5 had in mind when they comment that an issuer would be subrogated "in a
proper case."
145. The analysis is also contrary to a line of decisions, infra, which, by and large,
do not engage in any analysis. The decisions stand in opposition to the rule advanced
here but are not contrary to the analysis offered here. They do not have any analysis of
the questions the text raises and tend to apply the remedy without any unjust enrichment
inquiry. In short, the cases are generous in affording subrogation relief. To that extent,
they are generally opposed to the suggestion of this Article that courts be chary of
granting such relief. The decisions on these points, however, tend to grant subrogation
as mechanically as the cases that Boss criticized and that decline to grant it. In re Valley
Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991), is the paradigm of such cases.
There, the court decried mechanical jurisprudence of those cases that deny subrogation
and then, in turn, applied the remedy without any analysis of its own. See also FDIC v.
Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1986); Sun Co. v. Slamans (In
re Slamans), 148 B.R. 623 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992), affd. sub nom. CCF, Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 175 B.R. 762 (N.D. Okla. 1994), rev'd, 69 F.3d 468 (10th Cir.
1995); In re Minnesota Kicks, Inc., 48 B.R. 93 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
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Neither objection is persuasive. The answer to the first is evident in
analogous rules of commercial law. That law often penalizes a party whose
assets contribute to an estate if that party's behavior otherwise offends good
policy. When a bank makes a loan to a debtor and takes a security interest from
the debtor but fails to perfect that security interest, the Bankruptcy Code does not
permit the bank to enforce its security interest."4 Thus, the law takes the bank's
loan proceeds and uses them to enrich unsecured creditors of the borrower at the
expense of the bank. Virtually every secured transaction that fails by virtue of
a poorly drawn security agreement, a misfiled financing statement, or an
inadequate financing statement are instances of similar enrichment by a creditor
for the benefit of third parties that the law does not view as unjust. As a general
rule, subrogation does not relieve the distress of these erring creditors. 147 In the
past and to some extent today, bulk buyers that failed to comply with the bulk
sales laws enacted in some states faced a similar fate. If they failed to comply
with the notice provisions of the bulk sales law, they might take the seller's
goods subject to the claims of creditors148 or might be liable for the claims of the
seller's creditors 149 even though they paid value for the goods, which value might
also be available to the general creditors. Similarly, a secured party that extends
credit to a debtor, takes a security agreement, but fails to file its financing
statement for more than ten days, will lose its collateral to the trustee in
bankruptcy or debtor in possession if the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy
within ninety days, even though the secured party's loan proceeds will enrich the
debtor's unsecured creditors. 5 ' The law of negotiable instruments provides that
a party that fraudulently raises a negotiable instrument discharges obligors even
though the discharge may operate to give the obligors a windfall.'
These rules rest on the perception that even though one of the parties has
enriched another, commerce should not bear the burden of allowing the claimant
146. Under the strong arm clause of the Bankruptcy Code, the unperfected security
interest loses to a later hypothetical lien creditor and, therefore, to the trustee in
bankruptcy whom the Bankruptcy Code endows with the later hypothetical lien creditor's
rights. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994); U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1995).
147. See, e.g., In re Keidel, 613 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Wilcox, 196 B.R.
212 (Bankr. D. Maine 1996). But cf. Rinn v. First Union Bank, 176 B.R. 401 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1995) (subrogating unperfected secured party to rights of perfected secured creditor
whose debt it satisfied); Kaplan v. Walker, 395 A.2d 897 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978) (same).
148. See, e.g., Anderson & Clayton Co. v. Earnest, 610 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980, no writ); U.C.C. § 6-107 (1995).
149. See, e.g., Johnson v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 260 S.E.2d 325 (Ga.
1979).
150. The Bankruptcy Code treats the late filing as the date of the transfer and thus
renders the grant of the security interest a transfer of the debtor's property on account of
an antecedent debt and therefore avoidable under the preference section. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 547 (b)&(e)(2) (1994).
151. See U.C.C. § 3-407(b) (1995).
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to recover.'52 In each of these instances, the law countenances enrichment of
third parties at the hands of a lender or other creditor because policies paramount
to the unfairness of a particular case dictate such a result. In these cases, the
courts and the legislatures are saying that there may be enrichment at the expense
of the claimant, but that the enrichment is not unjust. In the abstract obligation
setting, the policy of protecting the abstract obligation device through the
independence principle and the policy of internalizing costs normally justifies
similar denial of subrogation.
The second objection that the analysis proposed here would, if accepted,
leave no room for the subrogation remedy is also unsound. It is true that this
Article advances arguments that would apply in many subrogation settings other
than the abstract obligation setting; but those arguments do not apply in all
subrogation settings; they do not apply in all abstract obligation settings. They
do not apply in cases where the credit issuer has no opportunity to bargain before
the fact with the parties against whom it seeks subrogation after the fact. They
do not apply to the classic fidelity bond setting out of which it originally made
sense: the actuarially priced undertaking of an enterprise in the business of
taking and evaluating actuarial risk that cannot bargain for rights with parties it
does not know. One cannot deny that subrogation can be a troublesome remedy.
It invites courts to reconstruct the transaction after the transaction has fallen
152. There is a substantial body of law, the commercial doctrine of good faith
purchase, that permits certain purchasers to defeat secured creditors or true owners who
create the appearance of ownership in a third party. See generally Grant Gilmore, The
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954); William
Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.
CHI. L. REv. 469 (1963). The doctrine protects the purchaser without regard to the fact
that the true owner or secured party may have contributed more to the value of the
property than the purchaser paid for it. Id.
Significantly, when commercial practices changed, some legislatures repealed their
bulk sales laws, freeing the bulk buyer from the need to see that bulk sellers give notice
of an impending sale, concluding, evidently, that it is unfair to penalize bulk buyers in
such fashion. Some have argued that the bulk sales laws never worked, except to the
extent that they occasionally trapped an unwary buyer. See Steven Harris, Article 6: The
Process and the Product-An Introduction, 41 ALA. L. REv. 549, 549-51 (1990). The
bulk sales laws rested on the assumption that creditors of the bulk seller were relying on
its stock in trade or equipment and that the bulk sales unfairly deprived those creditors
of their reasonable expectations that the bulk seller would use those assets to satisfy its
creditors before it closed its business. Though the practice of extending unsecured credit
on the basis of an enterprise's stock in trade and equipment was once a prime feature of
open account credit, see John Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 579, 580-84 (1993), it is probably a
vanishing commercial practice. For discussion of the policies served and disserved by
the bulk sales laws, see Steven Harris, The Interaction ofArticles 6 and 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Study in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39
VAND. L. REv. 179 (1986).
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apart. It may simply be a currently popular commercial remedy particularly
unsuited to some commercial transactions."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
It ought to be abundantly clear that mechanical denial of the subrogation
remedy conflicts with the law of equity and yields pernicious results. Thus,
courts should not deny equity on the basis of rhetorical analysis. Section 5-117
indorses this view. This Article attempts to show, however, that mechanically
granting the remedy is equally harmful. In short, whether subrogation should be
granted or denied must turn on the equities of a particular case. The illustration
of that analysis in the abstract obligation setting makes the case with some
clarity.
One must admit that the case against subrogation in the abstract obligation
context is not all embracing. There will undoubtedly arise cases in which it
would be unjust to leave the parties where they have left themselves. The critical
point this Article makes is that before they start altering commercial
relationships that the parties themselves confected, courts should engage in full
unjust enrichment analysis. That analysis is not complete when the court
observes that one party has paid money that permits another party to be enriched.
Courts must look to the entire transaction; and, when they do, they should not
forget that permitting subrogation will damage what has been a successful
commercial product: the abstract obligation. When they conduct that analysis,
moreover, they are not violating Section 5-117 of Revised Article 5. They are
only engaging in traditional subrogation inquiry, a staple of subrogation law that
Section 5-117 denies any intention to alter.
Finally, this Article attempts to show that the lesson from the abstract
obligation setting has universal application, that courts have been far too
generous in according the remedy, and that the result has been the
extemalization of costs that guarantors should bear. Usually, though not always,
guarantors and issuers that are present at the beginning of the underlying
transaction are in a position to protect themselves, while those who appear later
are not. The former are poor candidates for the remedy; the latter are prime
candidates.
153. The case against subrogation advanced here fails utterly in the consumer
setting. Consumers do not use letters of credit, however. Commercially sophisticated
parties use them. See Kerry Macintosh, Liberty, Trade, and the Uniform Commercial
Code: When Should Default Rules Be Based on Business Practices?, 38 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1465, 1515-21 (1997).
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APPENDIX
§ 5-117. Subrogation of Issuer, Applicant, and Nominated Person.
(a) An issuer that honors a beneficiary's presentation is subrogated to the
rights of the beneficiary to the same extent as if the issuer were a secondary
obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the beneficiary and of the applicant
to the same extent as if the issuer were the secondary obligor of the underlying
obligation owed to the applicant.
(b) An applicant that reimburses an issuer is subrogated to the rights of the
issuer against any beneficiary, presenter, or nominated person to the same extent
as if the applicant were the secondary obligor of the obligations owed to the
issuer and has the rights of subrogation of the issuer to the rights of the
beneficiary stated in subsection (a).
(c) A nominated person who pays or gives value against a draft or demand
presented under a letter of credit is subrogated to the rights of:
(1) the issuer against the applicant to the same extent as if the nominated
person were a secondary obligor of the obligation owed to the issuer
by the applicant;
(2) the beneficiary to the same extent as if the nominated person were a
secondary obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the
beneficiary; and
(3) the applicant to same extent as if the nominated person were a
secondary obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the applicant
(d) Notwithstanding any agreement or term to the contrary, the rights of
subrogation stated in subsections (a) and (b) do not arise until the issuer honors
the letter of credit or otherwise pays and the rights in subsection (c) do not arise
until the nominated person pays or otherwise gives value. Until then, the issuer,
nominated person, and the applicant do not derive under this section present or
prospective rights forming the basis of a claim, defense, or excuse.
Official Comment
1. By itself this section does not grant any right of subrogation. It grants
only the right that would exist if the person seeking subrogation "were a
secondary obligor." (The term "secondary obligor" refers to a surety, guarantor,
or other person against whom or whose property an obligee has recourse with
respect to the obligation of a third party. See Restatement of the Law Third,
Suretyship and Guaranty § 1 (1996)). If the secondary obligor would not have
a right to subrogation in the circumstances in which one is claimed under this
section, none is granted by this section. In effect, the section does no more than
to remove an impediment that some courts have found to subrogation because
they conclude that the issuer's or other claimant's rights are "independent" of the
underlying obligation. If, for example, a secondary obligor would not have a
subrogation right because its payment did not fully satisfy the underlying
obligation, none would be available under this section. The section indorses the
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position of Judge Becker in Tudor Development Group, Inc. v United States
Fidelity and Guaranty, 968 F.2d 357 (3d Cir.1991).
2. To preserve the independence of the letter of credit obligation and to
insure that subrogation not be used as an offensive weapon by an issuer or
others, the admonition in subsection (d) must be carefully observed. Only one
who has completed its performance in a letter of credit transaction can have a
right to subrogation. For example, an issuer may not dishonor and then defend
its dishonor or assert a setoff on the ground that it is subrogated to another
person's rights. Nor may the issuer complain after honor that its subrogation
rights have been impaired by any good faith dealings between the beneficiary
and the applicant or any other person. Assume, for example, that the beneficiary
under a standby letter of credit is a mortgagee. If the mortgagee were obliged
to issue a release of the mortgage upon payment of the underlying debt (by the
issuer under the letter of credit), that release might impair the issuer's rights of
subrogation, but the beneficiary would have no liability to the issuer for having
granted that release.
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